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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981 is the ninth of an annual
series of articles to be published in the Akron Law Review. The scope
of this survey is limited to the substantive developments in the field of
income taxation. The thrust of this article is not only to identify new de-
velopments, but also to trace these concepts through their formulative
changes.
Given the volatile nature of taxation, it is crucial for the practitioner
in this field to remain current with the changes which occur during the
year. Research for this article includes cases decided through August 31,
1981.
In an attempt to minimize the lead time between research and pub-
lication, this author has engaged the most able assistance of third year law
students. Without their substantial contributions and complete dedication,
this article would not have been possible. The author, therefore, wishes to
recognize and thank the following students for their efforts in researching,
writing and compiling this article:
William R. Meyer Project Coordinator
Cheri B. Cunningham Lead Editor
Akron Law Review
Ann E. Brennan Thomas A. Teodosio
Constance D. Butera Thomas J. Thomas
Patricia Leigh Linda R. Tucci
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A. Supreme Court Cases
A-1.00 Retroactive Tax Application
Early in 1981, the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Darus-
mont' upheld the constitutionality of a retroactively applied increase in the
1 101 S. Ct. 549 (1981).
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income tax rate for a tax preference item as enacted under the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.2
Section 301' of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 amended section 56(a)
of the 1954 Code.' The amendment increased the rate of minimum tax on pre-
ferences from ten to fifteen percent and reduced the exemption to the greater
of $10,000 or one-half the regular tax liability (with certain adjustments).
Section 301 (g) (1) retroactively applied the amendments of that section to
tax preference items for tax years after December 31, 1975, with certain
exceptions.'
In Darusmont the taxpayer attacked the retroactive application of
section 301. During the first half of 1976, the taxpayer had certain property
to sell.6 He and his real estate agent analyzed the various income tax con-
sequences that could result, depending on how the sale was handled, and
selected a plan of tax treatment. The property was sold on July 15, 1976.
The taxpayer computed his income tax under the tax laws then in effect
and determined that he would have no tax liability on the transaction.
However, on October 4, 1976, the President signed into law the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976. Due to the retroactive application of the new law,
the taxpayer was charged with a deficiency of $2,280 relative to this property
transaction.
The district court found that the retroactive amendments constituted
a "new, separate and distinct tax"" and concluded that as a matter of law the
circumstances of its application made it "not only harsh and oppressive but
basically unfair, and violative of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."' The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.'
The Supreme Court noted that almost every income tax statute has
had a retroactive application.' Generally the retroactive period has applied
only to the part of the calendar year that preceded the date of signing.
However, there have been two tax enactments which included a retroactive
period of a full year prior to the signing." The Court labeled the retroactive
2 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §
1, 56 (1976)).
3 26 U.S.C. § 56 (1976)
' I.R.C. § 56(a).
5 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1553 (1976).
eThe factual summary is drawn from 101 S. Ct. at 550-51.
7 Darusmont v. United States, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9671 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
aId.
9 Appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1252 (1976) which provides that direct appeal
to the Supreme Court may be taken when a statute is held to be unconstitutional in
any civil action to which the United States is a party.
;0 United States v. Darusmont, 101 S. Ct. at 551.
Id. at 552 referring to Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 200, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919) and
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 200(a), 44 Stat. 9 (1926).
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application of an income tax increase a "customary congressional practice."12
Further, the Court stated that the minimum tax rate preference item could
not be called "new" since it was first applied in 1969 and even then applied
to the very type of taxable subject being litigated: "the untaxed portion
of any net long-term capital gain."'"
The taxpayer conceded that a retroactive tax application did not violate
the Constitution per se. However, the taxpayer contended, there are three
separate tests which must be applied to determine if a tax as applied is
violative of due process.'4
The first test was whether a taxpayer could have acted differently at
the time of the transaction; could he have anticipated and avoided the tax?
Cases cited by the taxpayer to support this argument were gift tax cases,
but the Court found them not controlling precedent in a federal income
tax case. 5
Secondly, the taxpayer argued that he must have had notice of the
tax at the time of the transaction in order for the tax rate increase to be
applied. The Court assumed per arguendo that personal notice was relevant
but did not so decide. On this point, the Court concluded that the taxpayer
had ample notice because "[tihe proposed increase in rate had been under
public discussion for almost a year before its enactment."'
The third test proposed by the taxpayer to review a tax under the
Due Process clause was whether it was an imposition of a new tax or
merely an addition to an existing tax. The Court stated that what was in
issue was simply a variation of a rate of an already existing tax. The Court
quoted with approval remarks made by Judge Learned Hand:' 7
Nobody has a vested right in the rate of taxation, which may be
retroactively changed at the will of Congress at least for periods of
less than twelve months;... His is a different case from that of one
who, when he takes action, has no reason to suppose that any transac-
tions of the sort will be taxed at all. 8
The Supreme Court did not decide with finality the constitutionality
of a retroactive application of a tax increase that would pre-date the statu-
tory enactment by more than twelve months. Also, the Court implied that
the retroactive application of a new tax would not be allowed.
The Court's analysis was soft in several areas. The Court discussed
without deciding if, in fact, personal notice of a tax rate increase is re-
12United States v. Darusmont 101 S. Ct. at 552.
a Id. at 553 referring to Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
14 United States v. Darusmont, 101 S. Ct. at 553.
15 Id.
1e Id.
27Id. at 552-53.
28 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930) (emphasis added).
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quired. In this area the Court's reliance on "public discussion" to properly
notify the affected taxpayer seemed particularly ill-founded. The very
fact that in this situation an increase was included in each bill before the
House and the Senate would not have assisted the taxpayer as he planned
his transaction. The Court itself noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1976
was a "compromise between the House and Senate proposals."19 The Court
did not suggest how the average taxpayer might have known that a com-
promise was being struck and what it entailed. Nor did the Court consider
the amount of information that the average taxpayer receives with regard
to tax rates. The public's need for certainty in the handling of tax matters
was not considered.
The per curiam opinion does not offer any hope for a different judicial
finding given similar facts. Briefly, by calling the retroactive application
of a tax rate increase a "customary congressional practice"" the Court
pointed to the only entity that might vary the practice: Congress itself.
A-2.00 Percentage Depletion Allowance
The United States Supreme Court decided in Swank v. United States"'
than an otherwise eligible lessee of underground coal is not prevented from
having an economic interest in the coal in place because the lease contained
a clause permitting the lessor to terminate the lease without cause on thirty
days' notice. The IRS has consistently ruled that a lessee does not have
an economic interest where the lease is terminable without cause on thirty
to sixty days' notice by the lessor.2 Absent an economic interest the IRS
has not allowed the lessee to utilize the Code's depletion deduction.28 The
Swank holding stands in contradiction to the IRS's position regarding who
is entitled to depletion deduction when a lease of underground coal con-
tains a clause providing for termination on short notice.
In Swank the taxpayer operated a coal mine pursuant to a lease. In
exchange for a fixed royalty per ton, the lessor granted the lessee the right
to extract and sell the coal at prices fixed by the lessee. The lease provided
the lessor with the right to terminate the lease on thirty days' notice. Only
the lessee sought a percentage depletion deduction claiming an economic
interest in the coal.
The Code does not mandate a minimum duration of interest in min-
eral deposits for purposes of the depletion deduction." The treasury regu-
29 United States v. Darusmont, 101 S. Ct. at 553.
2od. at 552.
21101 S. Ct. 1931 (1981).
2 Whitmer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971); Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 C.B.
205; Rev. Rul. 72-477, 1972-2 C.B. 310.
23 I.R.C. § 611.
84 Id.
[Vol. 15:2
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/5
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981
lations merely require the taxpayer to have an "economic interest" in the
minerals.2"
The government first argued that the taxpayers possessed only an
economic advantage, rather than the required economic interest in the
coal deposits." The Court found that the taxpayer had a significant legal
and financial interest in the coal, both before and after it was mined, where
he was free to extract the coal, set its price, and then sell it on the open
market. In short, the Court held that the taxpayer had a depletable economic
interest rather than an economic advantage.
The government next contended that "as a matter of practical eco-
nomics," the lessors' right to terminate the lease gave them control of the
only significant economic interest in the coal. 7 The Court rejected this
argument and affirmed the conclusion reached by the Court of Claims that
"the mere existence of the lessors' unexercised right to terminate these leases
did not destroy the taxpayers' economic interest in the leased mineral de-
posits." In addition, it was held that "the Government has not suggested any
rational basis for linking the right to a depletion deduction to the period
of time that the taxpayer operates a mine." 9
In a strong dissent," Justice White stressed the Court's duty to de-
termine only whether or not the IRS's interpretation of the law was reason-
able. The dissent's view was that the IRS construction of the statute was
acceptable in this case. To support his opinion, Justice White pointed out
that the economic advantage-interest distinction was adopted in the treasury
regulations and that the Court has explicitly accepted this distinction in
prior cases."1
The Supreme Court's decision in Swank to allow the use of the in-
place depletion allowance provision may be interpreted as demonstrating
a swing towards favorable treatment of energy resource development.
A-3.00 Tax-Exempt Organizations
In HCSC-Laundry v. the United States2 the Supreme Court was asked
to determine whether a cooperative hospital laundry service qualified as
a tax-exempt organization under the Code. The decision turned on an
interpretation of sections 501(c)(3) and 501(e) which specify the types
of hospital service organization that qualify as charitable organizations.
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b), 26 C.F.R. § 1.611-1(b) (1980).
26 101 S. Ct. at 1937. The government relied on Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959), and
Paragon Jewel Coal Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965) where the Court held that
mining contractors had only an economic advantage in coal deposits.
2 101 S. Ct. at 1939.
281d. 291d.
8o ld. at 1939 (White, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting).
81 d. at 1940.
32 101 S. Ct. 836 (1981).
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In 1967, HCSC-Laundry was formed as a nonprofit organization to
relieve fifteen area hospitals of the maintenance and expense of individual
laundry and linen supply systems. Application was made to the IRS in
1976 for exemption under section 501(c)(3) which lists the types of
organization excluded from paying taxes to the federal government. Since
each of the fifteen hospitals served possessed a certificate of exemption under
this section, the HCSC-Laundry contended that the laundry service was
merely an extension of these organizations and should also qualify for ex-
emption. The IRS took the position that section 501(e) contained an ex-
clusive list of all the cooperative hospital service organizations which quali-
fied. Since laundry services were not included in the listing, the IRS denied
HCSC-Laundry's application."
After paying the taxes and receiving no response to its application for
a refund within six months, HCSC-Laundry filed suit in the United States
District Court which found in its favor. On appeal, the court of appeals
reversed holding that section 510(e) was the exclusive provision to which
a hospital service could look for exemption. "
In upholding the court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court referred
to the legislative history of section 501 (e) and noted that laundry services
had been discussed for possible inclusion in the listing but had been elimi-
nated from the final draft. 5 The court felt that this clearly showed that the
legislative intent was to exclude, rather than to include, laundry services
from the list of exempt organizations.
In addition, the court noted that the basic premise underlying income
taxation is that all income is taxable unless excluded by statute or rule of
law."6 Therefore, the court reasoned, unless it could be shown that cooper-
ative laundry services were specifically meant to be included as eligible
for exemption, income from such an organization would be subject to
taxation.
The dissent 7 in this case views section 501(e) as capable of broader
interpretation than it was given by the majority in that it does not state
that its list is exhaustive. Furthermore, even if section 501 (e) is not available
to petitioner, it seems reasonable to the dissent to grant tax exempt status
under section 501 (c) (3) read in light of section 501(a) which provides for
that status unless specific denial is found under section 502 or 503.
This decision was based primarily on the legislative history of section
501 (e). The fact that inclusion of laundry services had been discussed and
rejected on more than one occasion was persuasive. In interpreting statutes,
the court states that it is obliged to discover the legislative intent whenever
possible. In this case, that information was available to the court.
88 Id. at 837. 'ld. at 838. Id. at 839. 86 Id. at 838.
87 Id. at 840 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A-4.00 Attorney-Client Privilege
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,318 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the work product doctrine is ap-
plicable to avoid tax summonses and whether the attorney-client privilege39
covers communications between a corporation's employees and its general
counsel.
Upjohn, a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, was summoned by the
IRS to turn over results from an internal investigation it had conducted re-
lating to questionable payments made by its foreign subsidiaries to foreign
government officials to secure government business. The investigation was
conducted by Upjohn's general counsel and included questionnaires sent
to all foreign managers and interviews with company officers and employees.
On the basis of its findings, Upjohn voluntarily reported to the SEC some
of the details surrounding the payments. During a later audit by the IRS,
the SEC turned over these reports and the IRS demanded additional in-
formation from Upjohn so as to make an independent evaluation of the
tax consequences. Upjohn refused to comply with the IRS summons de-
manding the questionnaires and notes from the interviews contending that
they were protected under the attorney-client privilege and constituted the
work product of attorneys.
The United States filed a petition in Federal District Court seeking
enforcement of the summons. Upjohn thereafter appealed the finding of
the district court that the summons should be enforced.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals4" examined two tests that have been
used in relation to the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting.
The "subject matter" test' looks to the nature of the information and how
it was acquired by the corporate agent. Under this test if the agent acquired
the information in the ordinary course of his employment and it is confi-
dentially related to corporate counsel to enable him to give legal advice to
the corporate officers, it is protected. The Sixth Circuit rejected this test 2
in favor of the narrower "control group" test 3 which extends the privilege
only to the top officers in a corporation who would play an active role in
deciding how the corporation would react to the legal advice given. The
court felt this test was broad enough to satisfy the purposes of the privilege:
protecting privacy in the attorney-client relationship and promoting free
flow of information. The "subject matter" test, the court reasoned, would
38 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981).
89 See Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporate Clients, 15 AKRON
L. REv. 119 (1981).
40United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (1979).
41 Id. at 1226. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits rely on this test. Id.
42 Id. at 1227.
43 Id. at 1226. The Second and Third Circuits favor this test. Id. at n.8.
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tend to create a "zone of silence"" by corporate management encouraging its
agents to communicate with counsel so as to render it undiscoverable. The
case was remanded to the district court to determine which communications
under the IRS summons were made by Upjohn's "control group" and thereby
protected.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in view of the split
in the federal court regarding the attorney-client privilege. The Court
held that the communications made by Upjohn's employees fell within the
scope of the attorney-client privilege and that the work-product doctrine
applies in tax summons enforcement proceedings."
The Court rejected the "control group" test in that it "overlooks the
fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional
advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the
lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice."" The Court rea-
soned that use of this test would frustrate the purpose of the privilege by
discouraging the free flow of information to corporate counsel.
The work product doctrine was held by the Court to apply to IRS
summonses. 7 Strong public policy reasons were the basis for this aspect
of the holding in that such protection of privacy must attach to the at-
torney's work and thought processes. "
Even though the Upjohn decision appears to give specific guidelines
for the future, there will continue to be room for argument under the facts
of different cases. The decision must be read in light of the Supreme Court's
explicit refusal "to lay down a broad rule ... to govern all conceivable
future questions in this area."4 9
A-5.O0 Workmen's Compensation Integration
In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc.,'0 the United States Supreme
Court decided the issue of whether or not workmen's compensation benefits
could be offset against pension benefits. Prior to this decision, the IRS de-
termined in revenue rulings"' issued prior to the enactment of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, (ERISA)" that workmen's com-
pensation payments could offset pension plan payments. In 1978, the Sixth
Circuit 3 held that to reduce pension benefits in such a manner would be
impermissible under the nonforfeitability provisions of ERISA.
"Id. at 683. 45Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 681.
46 Id. at 683. 47Id. at 686.
'
8 The government argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) allowed the in-
formation to be reached because of necessity. The Court responded that a greater showing
of unavailability and necessity would be required to reach protected information than the
government made here. Id. at 688.
491d. at 681. S0 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981). 51 Id. at 1904 n.15.
- 29 U.S.C. § 1001, 1053(a) (1976).
58 Utility Workers Union of America v. Consumers Power Co., 453 F. Supp. 477 (D. Mich.
1978).
[Vol. 15:2
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/5
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981
A lessi involved two separate suits brought in New Jersey state courts by
retired employees of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. and General Motors Corp.
[hereinafter referred to as petitioner corporations]. Each of these corpora-
tions maintained employee pension plans which provided for the reduction
in the employee's retirement benefits by an amount equal to the workmen's
compensation award for which the individual is eligible.5' The pension plans
are subject to federal regulation under ERISA.55
In 1977, the New Jersey Legislature amended that state's Worker's
Compensation Act to prohibit such offsets.5 Thereafter, the retired em-
ployees alleged that the petitioner corporations had violated the amended
state act. The corporations removed the suits to the United States District
Court which held that the pension offset provisions were invalid under New
Jersey law and were prohibited by ERISA.5" The district courts also struck
down a treasury regulation 8 which authorized such offsets. The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals from the two district
courts decisions and reversed the holdings.59
The Court, in Alessi, agreed with the determination of the court of ap-
peals that offset provisions of private pension plans which reduce a retiree's
benefits by the amount of workmen's compensation awards received prior
to retirement do not cause a forfeiture of vested rights."0 The Court stated
that in enacting ERISA, Congress permitted integration of pension plan
benefits with Social Security benefits."' The Court also noted that ERISA
does not mention integration with workmen's compensation. In resolving this
controversy, the Court stressed the fact that Congress was aware of the
revenue rulings which expressly approved the reduction of pension benefits
by the amount of workmen's compensation for which an individual is
eligible,6" yet left these rulings in effect by enacting ERISA. The Court
reasoned that by not directly addressing the dispute, Congress intended to
embrace the revenue rulings."3
With the Supreme Court's approval, employers may now reduce cer-
tain employee benefits by the integration of the pension plan with workmen's
compensation as well as with the social security integration previously used.
A-6.00 Letter Ruling as Evidence
In Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States," the Supreme Court held
54 101 S. Ct. at 1898. 55 Id.
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34: 15-29 (West 1959) (as amended by 1977 NJ. Laws, ch. 156).
In Alessi, the Court held that this statute was pre-empted by ERISA. 101 S. Ct. at 1906.
-1729 U.S.C. § 1001, 1053(a) (1976).
5sTreas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(a) (1979).
59 Buczynski v. General Motors Corp. 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1980).
60 101 S. Ct. at 1899. 62 Id. at 1901. 6 2d. at 1904.
asId. 04101 S. Ct. 2281 (1981).
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that an employer need not pay Social Security (FICA) 5 and Federal Un-
employment Insurance (FUTA) 6' taxes on the value of meals and lodging
furnished to employees where section 119 of the Code ' applied to exclude
such items from income. As a result of this important decision, the with-
holding requirements for Section 119 benefits 8 should be eliminated and
employers will most likely claim refunds for over-paid taxes."
At issue in Rowan was whether an employer was required to in-
clude the value of meals and lodging, which he provided to employees for
his own convenience, in the computation of wages for the determination
of FICA and FUTA taxes.
The IRS relied on the FICA and FUTA tax regulations0 concerning
"facilities or privileges," which subject the value of meals and lodging to
FICA and FUTA taxation as wages. The interpretation of "wages" found
in these regulations conflicts with section 119 which excludes the value
of meals and lodging provided for the convenience of an employer from
an employee's income and exempts such items from income tax with-
holding.7
The Court resolved this dispute by holding the FICA and FUTA tax
"facilities or privileges" regulations invalid."2 The Court stressed the need
for consistency between specific statutory language and interpretive regu-
lations. Wages was specifically defined by Congress for FICA, FUTA and
income tax withholding purposes."3 Therefore, the "facilities or privileges"
regulations interpretation of the term wages, in a manner which was in-
consistent with the statutory language, was accorded little significance.
The consistency standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Rowan
should quell the Service's assault on fringe benefits.7" It is clear that any regu-
lation defining the term wages for FICA and FUTA purposes, must be
65 I.R.C. § 3101 et. seq. [hereinafter, the term Social Security tax shall be referred to as
FICA].
66 I.R.C. § 3301 et. seq. [hereinafter, the term Federal Unemployment Insurance Tax shall
be referred to as FUTA].
67 I.R.C. § 119.
68 I.R.C. § 3402(a) provides that "every employer making payment of wages shall deduct and
withhold upon such wages a tax determined in accordance with tables prescribed by the
Secretary."
69 Kovey & Winslow, Supreme Court in Rowan Holds "Wages" Excludable From Income
Are Exempt From FICA, FUTA, 55 J. TAx 130 (1981).
70 See Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(a)-l(f) (1975) and 31.3306(b)-l(f) (1975).
71 .R.C. § 119.
72 101 S. Ct. at 2297.
78 Wages, for FICA and FUTA purposes, was defined by Congress as "all remuneration
for employment." See I.R.C. § 3121(a) and 3306(b). For purposes of income tax with-
holding, wages was defined as "all remuneration . . . for services performed by an em-
ployee for his employer." See I.R.C. § 3401 (a).
74 See Rev. Proc. 80-53, 1980-2 C.B. 848, where the IRS states that fringe benefits exceeding
$600 be reported on an employee's W-2 form even though no withholding is required.
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consistent with the definition of wages for purposes of income tax withhold-
ing.7
The significance of Rowan extends beyond its promulgation of the
consistency standard. Rowan represents the first time the Supreme Court
acknowledged that a private letter ruling may be admitted as evidence in
a court proceeding.76 The Court cited numerous private letter rulings as
evidence that over an eleven-year period, from 1954 to 1965, the IRS
had failed to construe the term "wages" in a consistent manner with refer-
ence to its tax treatment of meals and lodging provided by employers for
their own convenience, to employees.".
While using these rulings as evidence of inconsistent tax treatment by
the IRS, the Court made it clear that private letter rulings have no prece-
dential value and concern only the taxpayer who requested the ruling. 8
Such language serves as a reminder that private letter rulings are not to
be relied upon as precedent for any tax issue.'
A-7.00 Mining and Nonmining Costs
In Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah,"0 a dispute arose be-
tween the IRS and an integrated mining-manufacturing company concern-
ing the company's method of calculating depletion.81 The Supreme Court
was asked to interpret the term "first marketable product" as it is used in
section 611.
Portland Cement Company mined cement rock, processed it into ce-
ment, and sold the cement in bulk and by bag. In calculating its constructive
gross income from its mining operations, the company elected to use the
proportionate profits method. This method uses the costs from and proceeds
of the company's "first marketable product." The company took the position
that the "first marketable product" was cement sold in bulk only, and
therefore excluded the bagging costs and premiums (the increase for selling
cement in bags) from its calculations. Because bagging costs exceeded
premiums, this exclusion resulted in a greater constructive income for the
mining operations, which therefore increased the percentage depletion
amount allowed. The IRS contended that the bagged cement was the "first"
marketable product," and therefore bagging costs and premiums should be
included in the calculations of mining gross income.
The Regulations define "first marketable product" as "the product (or
group of essentially the same products) produced by the taxpayer as a result
75Kovey & Winslow, supra note 69, at 136.
76 101 S. Ct. at 2296.
771d.
rid. See also I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) and Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-7(b) which provide that a
private letter ruling has no precedential value.
79 See Kovey & Winslow, supra note 69, at 130.
80101 S. Ct. 1037 (1981). 62 See I.R.C. § 611,
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of the application of nonmining processes, in the form or condition in which
such product or products are first marketed in significant quantities by the tax-
payer or by others in taxpayer's marketing area." 2 The regulations also state,
"For this purpose, bulk and packaged products are considered to be essentially
the same product."8' 3
Portland Cement, which used the "proportionate profits" method,
agreed that the treasury regulations were not unreasonable. However, the
company urged the Court to focus on the facts of Portland Cement's par-
ticular situation, and argued that if the regulations were strictly applied to the
company, the percentage of profits from mining would be distorted, resulting
in a lower constructive gross income and, therefore, a lower depletion allow-
ance. This distortion, the company, contended, is a result of an acceptance of
a basic assumption upon which the "proportionate profits" method is based:
i.e., that each dollar of costs earns the same percentage of income regardless
of whether the costs are incurred during mining or during manufacturing.
It was argued that this was not a valid assumption in this case since Portland
Cement's profit margin on bagged cement was less than on bulk cement.
Relying on United States v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co.," Portland Cement
contended that the mining phase should be viewed as an independent entity
and that profits derived from that phase should not be diluted by costs in-
curred in the manufacturing phase. Portland took the position that only
costs incurred in the production of bulk cement should be considered since
the incremental costs incurred in bagging the cement exceeded the incre-
mental revenue derived from the sale of bagged cement, resulting in a
lower profit against which depletion could be taken.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the
Commissioner's position that costs incurred in the production of both bulk
and bagged cement should be used in the calculations. The Court stated
that the meaning of the statute was clear and that special treatment for
this taxpayer was not warranted.8 First, Portland Cement had been given
the opportunity to submit an alternative method of depletion to the IRS
for approval but did not do so.86 Secondly, the taxpayer was in good finan-
cial health and this was not a matter of creating a loss versus a profit by a
rigid application of the regulations, but rather a lower marginal profit
versus a higher marginal profit upon which the depletion percentage would be
applied. In addition, and most importantly, the Court reasoned that the
"proportionate profits" method was never intended to be a precise reflection
of profits but was merely an approximation. 8 As such, integrated mining-
manufacturing operations which use the "proportionate profits" method must
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.613-4(d)(4)(iv) (1972).
83Id.
84364 U.S. 76 (1960).
P 101 S. Ct. at 1045. 86 Id. at 1041. 87 Id.
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accept the fact that its application will result in variations from company
to company and from industry to industry.
As a result of this case, integrated mining-manufacturing companies
which must calculate a constructive gross income for depletion purposes
would be wise to analyze thoroughly the production costs of their "first
marketable product" and consider applying to the IRS for approval of an
alternative method if distortions in gross income would result from the
application of the proportionate profits method. As long as an alternative
avenue is open to the taxpayer, it appears that the regulations in this area
will continue to be rigidly applied.
A-8.00 Natural Gas -First Use Tax
In Maryland v. Louisiana," a case of original jurisdiction, the United
States Supreme Court held that Louisiana's "first use tax" was unconstitu-
tional. The "first use tax" imposed a tax on any natural gas coming into
the state of Louisiana which had not been already subjected to a state or
federal tax, and which was not ultimately consumed within the state itself.89
The tax is due after the first taxable "use" of the gas occurs in Louisiana.-"
The stated purpose of the tax was "to reimburse the people of Louisiana
for damages to the State's waterbottoms, barrier islands, and coastal areas
resulting from the introduction of natural gas into Louisiana from areas
not subject to state taxes as well as to compensate for the costs incurred
by the State in protecting those resources." 91 This protection was seen as
necessary to equalize competition between in-state produced natural gas
and out-of-state gas, as well as to protect Louisiana's natural resources.92
In invalidating this statute, the Supreme Court held that the tax
conflicted with federal regulations which control the sale and regulation of
natural gas 3 and it therefore violated the Supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution." The Court further found that the tax discriminated
against interstate commerce in favor of local commerce in violation of the
Commerce clause. 5 In a separate decision the Supreme Court ordered the
State of Louisiana to refund all taxes collected by means of the "first use
tax."1 e
S8 101 S. Ct. 2114 (1981).
8 9 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301-1351 (West Supp., 1980).
9old. at § 1305.
91 101 S. Ct. at 2121, paraphrasing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1301(C) (West Supp. 1980).
92 IA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (West Supp. 1980).
93 101 S. CL at 2131-2132.
",The Supremacy Clause states: 'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. Art. VI, cl.2.
'5 101 S. Ct. at 2136. In pertinent part, the Commerce Clause states: "The Congress shall
have Power . . t]o regulate Commerce among the several States. Art. 1 § 8 cl.3.
96 Maryland v. Louisiana 101 S. Ct. 3075 (1981).
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A-9.00 Coal Severance Tax
In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana," the Supreme Court held
that Montana's severance tax on coal mined in the state does not violate
the Supremacy"8 or Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution.
The tax was levied at various rates depending on the value, energy content,
and method of extraction of the coal. The tax rates ranged to a maximum
of thirty percent of the "contract sales price.""' Montana coal producers
were joined by their out-of-state utility company clients in a state court
action seeking refunds of severance taxes paid under protest. The trial
court upheld the tax and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed that
decision.""
In holding that the state severance tax did not violate the Commerce
clause, the United States Supreme Court stated that "the Montana tax
must be evaluated under Complete Auto Transit's four-part test ....
[whereby] a state tax does not offend the Commerce Clause if it 'is applied to
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly appor-
tioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly re-
lated to services provided by the State.' ""'
Appellants did not dispute that the Montana tax met the first two parts
of the Complete Auto Transit test; their argument was that the tax was
invalid under the final two parts of the Complete Auto Transit test. Con-
cerning the third part, the Court found that the tax did not discriminate
against interstate commerce since the tax burden was "borne according
to the amount of coal consumed and not according to any distinction be-
tween in-state and out-of-state consumers."' 3
Nor was the Montana tax found by the Court to be invalid under part
four of the Complete Auto Transit test. Appellants argued that the tax
burden borne by the out-of-state consumers of Montana coal was excessive
and that the amount of money which Montana received in taxes far ex-
ceeded the value of the services provided to the coal mining industry.' "
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and stated that the appellants
had misunderstood the nature of the inquiry under the fourth prong of the
Complete Auto Transit test. The correct test is not the amount of the tax
or the value of the benefits allegedly bestowed as measured by the costs the
State incurs on account of the taxpayer's activities. Rather, the proper test
for the fourth part of Complete Auto Transit is that "the interstate business
must have a substantial nexus with the State before any tax may be levied on
9? 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). 98U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl.2.
99U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
10 MoNT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979).
101 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980).
102 101 S. CL at 2953 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
103 101 S. Ct. at 2954-55. 104 Id. at 2958.
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it . . . [and] the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the
extent of the contact [with the state], since it is the activities of presence
of the taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear a 'just share
of state tax burden.' ""'5
The appellant's Supremacy clause argument was also rejected by the
Court. Appellants argued that the Montana tax, as applied to the mining
of federally owned coal, was invalid because it substantially frustrated the
purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.101 The Court found
that there is no language in the federal statute which promotes the use of
coal, that supports the appellants assertion that Congress intended to "cap-
ture all 'economic rents' from the mining of federal coal and then . . .
distribute the proceeds in accordance with a statutory formula."'0° Finally,
the Court noted that Congress expressly authorized the states to impose
taxes on federal lessees. 03 Therefore, it appears that as long as states meet
the Complete Auto Transit test, they are free to implement a coal severance
tax.
B. Recent Developments
B-1.00 Income
B-1.01 Distortion of Income
The U. S. District Court in Nebraska held, in McGee v. United States,09
that absent proof of distortion of income to avoid taxation, the IRS may
not allocate income under Code section 482.
McGee, a physician, entered into a personal services contract with a
hospital to take charge of its emergency room. Later, the doctor-taxpayer
formed a corporation and assigned his contractual rights with the hospital
to the corporation. McGee reported $10,334 to the IRS as an independent
contractor and the corporation reported $51,666 of the $62,000 paid under
the personal services contract. The IRS contended that the corporation was
a sham and invoked section 482 to allocate the total $62,000 as income
to the doctor-taxpayer.
The court found the corporation to be a valid entity properly in-
corporated under the laws of the state. Therefore, the use of section 482
was found to be inapplicable "because there was no distortion of income
to avoid taxation."' "
If the IRS had been successful in its attempt to allocate the corpo-
ration's income to the doctor-taxpayer, the full amount would have been
205 Id.
woe30 U.S.C. § 181-287. (1976, Supp. Il 1978, & Supp. M 1979), as amended by Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, P.L. 95-554, § 8, 92 Stat. 2075.
10? 101 S. Ct. at 2961. 108 Id. at 2962.
109 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9184 at (D. Neb. 1980).
210 Id.
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taxable to the doctor. But in this case, a valid, viable corporation protected
the taxpayer from the IRS's attempt to allocate the income.
B-1.02 Interest Free Loans
Adhering to the principle of stare decisis, the Tax Court in Baker v.
Commissioner"' held that the taxpayer did not realize taxable income from
interest-free loans received from a corporation of which he was both presi-
dent and shareholder. Even though the taxpayer owned tax-exempt securities
at the same time, it was shown that the loans had not been used to make
the securities purchases.
Mr. Baker, for the three years in question, used a running loan account
from his closely held corporation to make his estimated tax payments. "There
were no votes, no specific plan of repayment, and no interest was charged
or paid. During 1973, Mr. Baker made monthly repayments in amounts
of $1,000 to $3,000. In 1974, he made one payment of $50,000 and
made no repayments during 1975."
Mr. Baker began the period in question as owner of $129,000 worth
of tax-exempts and invested $45,000 per year for each of the successive
years. According to the Tax Court, "the record does not show any correla-
tion in time or otherwise between corporation loans and the investments
in the tax-exempt securities. Accordingly, it does not appear that such loan
indebtedness was incurred or continued to carry or purchase tax-exempt
securities within section 265 (2).,,'
Although the court admitted that this section could be read so as to
cover this particular situation, the courts have required more than the simul-
taneous existence of ownership of tax-exempts and indebtedness."' There
must be "a 'purposeful connection' between the taxpayer's indebtedness
and the ownership of the tax-exempt obligations.""'
The IRS will undoubtedly contest this opinion since it reaffirmed the
Dean"' decision which it has been attempting to have overruled since 1973.
In Dean, the taxpayers borrowed two million dollars interest-free from a
corporation they controlled. No income was attributed to them for the
free use of this money based on the reasoning that an offsetting deduction
would have been available to them if interest had, in fact, been paid."' Even
11175 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 75.11 at 92 (1980).
112 d.
I's ld. at 95. This section states that no deduction shall be allowed for "[m'nterest on in-
debtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations the interest of which is
wholly exempt from taxes imposed." I.R.C. § 265(2) (emphasis added).114 Id. citing Swenson Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 686, 695 (1975), and
New Mexico Bancorporation v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1342, 1353 (1980).
I's 75 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 7511 at 95.
1is Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
127 Id. at 1090.
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though the IRS has attacked this holding in later cases, the courts have
actually widened the number of situations in which interest-free loans may
not produce realized income.
In Crown v. Commissioner,1 1 8 the court held that a gift tax need not
be levied on the amount of foregone interest when a loan, payable on de-
mand, was made from a parent to a child.
In Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner,1 9 the transfer of
funds without interest, between corporations owned by the same persons
did not result in a constructive dividend to the shareholders. This was
held because none of the funds were used for the benefit of the taxpayer
even though there was no specific business purpose for the loans.
In Zager v. Commissioner,2 ° the IRS made a direct attack on the
Dean holding because the fact situation was basically the same. The Tax
Court, however, refused to find that income was realized from interest-free
loans. The Court could not accept the government's reasoning as sufficient
to overturn "prior practice (that) spanned a period of 60 years - from
1913 to 1973 . . . .Too much water has passed over the dam to warrant
reexamining the situation judicially .... [I]f a contrary result is deemed
desirable, the appropriate remedy should be legislative rather than ju-
dicial.""21
The court again followed Dean in Greenspun v. Commissioner.'2
In this case Mr. Greenspun was granted a $4,000,000 loan at 3% interest
by Howard Hughes in return for favorable treatment of Mr. Hughes in Mr.
Greenspun's newspaper. The court reasoned that if the difference between
the interest charged and market rates was calculated as compensation, Mr.
Greenspun would also have had a corresponding interest deduction, result-
ing in a wash out. Therefore, the court held that Greenspun had no taxable
income as a result of the transaction. 2
In both the Zager and Greenspun decisions, reference was made to
the possibility that a different result might occur "if the indebtedness were
incurred by the stockholder or officer to purchase or carry tax exempt
bonds." ' The court in Greenspun stated that for the years in question "no
118 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
19497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974).
12072 T.C. 1009 (1979).
12 1 Id. at 1013.
2272 T.C. 931 (1979).
12sThe Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same result based on Dean in Suttle
v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit also followed this rea-
soning in Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981), where a non-shareholder
principal officer of a corporation was held to have no realized income as a result of in-
terest-free loans made by the corporation.
l24 Zager v. Commissioner, 72 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 72.82 at 555.
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portion of the loan proceeds was invested, partially or wholly, . . . in
tax-exempt securities."' 5
Based on this language, the holding in Baker was unexpected. Absent
congressional action on this matter, it would appear that interest-free loans
may be an avenue a closely held corporation may use to provide additional
benefits to officer-shareholders as well as children of shareholders. How-
ever, the practitioner should proceed cautiously, keeping in mind such
code traps as the accumulated earnings provisions,"' even though the
safe harbor here was increased to $250,0001 by Congress in the Economic
Recovery Act of 1981. Taxpayers should also be careful to make the loan
payable on demand in order to avoid the pitfalls of gifts, as discussed in
Crown."2 8
B-1.03 Relocation Service Fees
Recent letter rulings" 9 indicate that an employer may deduct certain
relocation expenses of transferring employees without the employees recog-
nizing income. Both letter rulings concerned an employer who contracted
with an employee relocation management company. The agreement stated
that the relocation company would purchase the homes of transferring em-
ployees at appraised values and then resell them within 360 days. The fees
paid by the employer include costs of appraisals; purchaser's fees; closing
costs; a percentage of any loss on the property's subsequent resale; carrying
costs including taxes, insurance, utilities, and monthly interest on the equity
advanced to the employee; and direct selling costs. The IRS ruled that
the employee must account for any gain realized on the sale of his house,
but that he would not have to include any of the above fees paid by his
employer in his gross income.' The IRS further ruled that because the
payment of these relocation expenses bolsters the transferring employee's
morale thereby increasing productivity and efficiency, these expenses are
ordinary and necessary business expenses."' Therefore, the employer may
deduct the payments to the relocation company. This plan would make
an excellent fringe benefit because if the employee pays his moving expenses
himself, his deduction is subject to the moving expense limitations.
B-1.04 Imputed Interest Rates
Under prior law, if property was sold under a deferred payment or
installment agreement, the IRS would impute a seven percent compounded
interest rate if the specified interest rate was less than six percent. Under
12 5Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 72.78 at 516.
(Emphasis added).
2I.R.C. §§ 531-61.
127 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 232, 95 Stat. 172 (amending
I.R.C. § 535(c)).
128585 F.2d at 237.
129 Letter Ruling 8016098 (1980); Letter Ruling 8113020 (1980).
'
3 oLetter Ruling 8016098 (1980). "'ILetter Ruling 8113020 (1980).
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new regulations, 3 ' the imputed interest rate is ten percent compounded
semi-annually if the specified interest rate is less than nine percent simple
interest.' The new regulations are effective with respect to sales or ex-
changes occurring on or after July 1, 1981.
Also under prior law,"" if there were loans or advances between two
or more related parties, IRS would impute the interest rates on these ad-
vances when the interest rates in the agreement were outside of the "safe
haven" from six to eight percent. The new regulations'" change the safe
haven range to eleven to thirteen percent and the imputed interest rate
from seven percent to twelve percent. The new interest rates are effective
with respect to loans or advances made on or after July 1, 1981. The new
safe haven rule does not apply to loans or advances if the interest and
principal are both stated in the agreement in the form of a foreign currency.
An exception to the above imputed interest rate changes is present
in The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which provides that quali-
fied sales of real estate will be subject to imputed interest rates of only seven
percent. A qualified sale is any sale or exchange of land by an individual
to a member of his family. However, aggregate qualified sales between any
two individuals are limited to $500,000 annually. If a taxpayer desires to
receive the lower imputed interest rate, he must sell his land to a family
member for a price of $500,000 or less. Otherwise, the new higher interest
rates will be imputed to the amount over the limit.
B-2.00 Deductions (Personal)
B-2.01 Home Office Expense
In Weightman v. Commissioner"" section 280A(c) (1) was interpreted
so that the phrase "a portion of the dwelling unit," in reference to a deduc-
tion for a home office, may be satisfied without physical barriers or walls.
College Professor Weightman took a home office deduction which was dis-
allowed by the IRS on the basis that the taxpayer failed to show that the
home office was maintained "for the convenience of his employer" as
section 280A requires. The Tax Court affirmed this decision.
Taxpayer's home office consisted of a portion of his bedroom. The
IRS urged an interpretation of section 280A(c) (1) that would require
either "an entire room or some portion or area of a room physically sepa-
rated."' 8 The court rejected this interpretation, choosing instead to hold
that a "separate, though unmarked, area that [is] used exclusively and
on a regular basis as [a] home office"' 9 complies with the statutory require-
182 1981-30 I.R.B. 5. The new regulations amend Treas. Reg. § 1.483.1 (1966).
188 1981-30 I.R.B. at 7. 284 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (1968).
185 1981-30 I.R.B. at 7. 186 Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 126, 95 Stat. 172.
187 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81-301 at 1027 (1981).
s8 Id. at 1030. 1 9 Id. at 1031.
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ments. The court further stated that exclusiveness of use of an area is simply
another fact for the trier of facts to determine. Physical barriers or lack
of them is "a factor for the Court to weigh."140
Although the court disallowed the home office deduction in this case,
its interpretation of the phrase "a portion of a dwelling unit" in section
280A(c)(1) may be helpful to taxpayers in the future. The court said
that evidence of exclusive use of unmarked areas would be viewed more
critically but left the door open for a taxpayer to prove that such an area
in a home was, in fact, used regularly and exclusively for the convenience
of his employer.
B-2.02 Business Expense - Fashion Clothing
In Pevsner v. Commissioner"" the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
allowed a deduction for clothing as a business expense under sections 162
and 262 of the Code. This decision is clearly in line with the traditional
interpretation of the nondeductibility of personal expenses.
Sandra Pevsner was employed as the manager of a boutique in Dallas
which specialized in clothing design by Yves St. Laurent (YSL). Mrs.
Pevsner was required by her employer to wear clothing by this designer
in her work. However, because of store policy, she was not allowed to wear
these items without purchasing them. Although these clothes were designed
for ordinary use, Mrs. Pevsner's lifestyle was such that the clothing she
was required to purchase was inappropriate for her off-duty hours. She
therefore deducted the cost of the clothing on her tax return as a business
expense.
The Tax Court... allowed these deductions'" based on convincing evi-
dence of Mrs. Pevsner's lifestyle and:
that the wearing of YSL apparel outside work would be inconsistent
with that lifestyle; in such a situation the basis for allowing a deduc-
tion is far more persuasive than in a situation in which the clothes
would be worn by a taxpayer outside his work but he merely, as a
matter of personal taste, does not choose to wear such clothes when
not at work.'44
In addition, the court mentioned that the financial burden which the tax-
payer had to assume exceeded that which would ordinarily arise from the
purchase of work clothes.
140 Id.
1- 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980).
142 13 AKRON L. REv. 225 (1979).
148 Pevsner v. Commissioner, 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 79, 310 at 1164 (1979). The Tax Court
relied on Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757 (1958) where a similar clothing deduction
was allowed. The IRS acquiesced in this decision (1959-1 C.B. 5) but withdrew its ac-
quiescence after the Pevsner decision (1981-19 I.R.B. 5).
2
44 d. at 1166 (emphasis added).
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The court of appeals, however, reversed the Tax Court on the rationale
that a fact as subjective as an individual's personal life style should not serve
as the basis for allowing such a deduction.14 The court stated that:
The generally accepted rule governing the deductibility of cloth-
ing expenses is that the cost . . . is deductible as a business expense
only if: (1) the clothing is of a type specifically required as a condition
of employment, (2) it is not adaptable to general usage as ordinary
clothing, and (3) it is not so worn.1"
The court reiterated the desirability of an objective rule which both the
taxpayer and the IRS could utilize to make determinations as to deductions
because the use of a subjective approach provides no guidelines." 7 The
court of appeals was convinced of the merits of an objective test because under
a subjective standard the tax posture of two similarly situated boutique man-
agers would vary on the basis of their individual lifestyles. The court viewed
this result as an unreasonable interpretation of sections 162 and 262.'"
An attempt to circumvent the nondeductibility of clothing rule by
means of leased suits received no support in Revenue Ruling 80-322.'"
The IRS takes the position that the taxpayer must include in his gross in-
come the fair market value of the suits leased to him. Where suits are cus-
tom tailored for employees and have little value at the end of the leasing
period, a purchase rather than lease will be found for tax purposes. How-
ever, the corporate suit owner can receive a deduction for this amount
as additional compensation.
B-2.03 Medical Expense - Tuition
As a result of the decision in Fay v. Commissioner,' a taxpayer may
deduct as a medical expense the additional cost of tuition charged for his
children's participation in a language development program for the learning
disabled. Two of the Fay children were found to have learning disabilities
which prevented them from benefitting from a normal classroom situation.
On the advice of their pediatrician, the Fays consulted specialists who recom-
mended enrollment at a Montessori school which also provided a separate
learning disabilities program.
The school the children attended did not qualify as a special school
as defined by the tax regulations,"' since its main purpose was to provide
an educational program, not to provide therapeutic treatment. Therefore, a
deduction for the complete tuition was not allowed. However, the learning
disabilities program was classified as one which "would alleviate or mitigate
14'Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d at 470.
1 6 Id. at 469 citing Donnely v Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1959).
147 Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d at 470.
14aId. at 471. 149 1980-2 C.B. 36.
15076 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. t 76.32 at 219 (1981).
'15Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (1) (v) (a) (1960).
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the mental problems their children had."' Since a fee for this was sepa-
rately charged, that amount could be a medical deduction even though the
staff providing the service was not medically trained.
Schools which provide such programs would be well advised to bill
the clients separately for this service in order for the parents to benefit
from this decision. It is also important that at some point a medical doctor
state that a problem exists that can be alleviated through a special program.
B-2.04 Casualty Loss - Insurance
Prior case law held that insured casualty losses were not deductible
if the taxpayer elected not to be reimbursed for the loss by the insurance
company. 5 ' Also, an employee could not deduct business expenses when
he voluntarily chose not to seek reimbursement of those expenses from his
employer." ' However, recent decisions have held that such losses or expenses
may still be deductible.
In Hills v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayer's house had been burglarized
four times in an eight-year period. On the first three occasions, the tax-
payer had been reimbursed by his insurer. Hovever, the taxpayer made no
insurance claim on the fourth burglary because he feared that his policy
would not be renewed. Instead, he absorbed the loss and deducted it from
his income. The IRS, in disallowing the deduction, argued that the taxpayer's
loss resulted from an election not to be reimbursed, and that, therefore, the
loss did not result from the theft itself. The Tax Court disagreed and held
that the IRS had unjustifiably expanded the meaning of "not compensated
for by insurance" in section 165 (a) to include potential recoupment, and
that such an expanded definition would create an unjust advantage for
voluntarily uninsured taxpayers."' This decision was not unanimous, and
the dissenting opinion was in agreement with the position of the IRS." '
In Waxier Towing Co., Inc. v. United States,"' a marine towing busi-
ness was required by contract with its customers to carry insurance. Its
previous accident experience had been so poor that its prior underwriters
had refused to renew coverage. When one of its barges was damaged in a
collision, the company calculated that it would be less expensive to pay
for the damage itself rather than make an insurance claim with the resulting
higher premiums. When the company deducted the cost of repairs, the
IRS disallowed it. The district court held that these costs were not deductible
as casualty losses, citing Kentucky Utilities Co., v. Glenn."' However, the
'52 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.32 at 222.
158 Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968).
54Heidt v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 25 (1959).
15576 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.42 at 260 (1981).
156 Id. at 261. 157 Id. at 264.
15BWaxler Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Tenn. 1980).
259394 F.2d 631.
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court said that these costs were deductible as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses due to the necessity of remaining insurable.
In Neal v. Commissioner,' ° the taxpayer was the director of a financially
troubled branch of the YMCA. In an austerity plan, he decided that em-
ployees would not be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the use of their
personal automobiles for business purposes, despite a general YMCA policy
to reimburse such expenses. When the taxpayer deducted his automobile
expenses incurred for business purposes, the IRS disallowed the deduction.
The Commissioner contended that because the taxpayer had the right and
authority to demand reimbursement and had failed to do so, the expenses
were not deductible. The Tax Court disagreed and held that if the taxpayer
had demanded reimbursement he would have failed to meet a condition
of his employment, which was to take steps to reduce the branch's ex-
penditures. The court said that it was this unique set of facts that would
make the expenses deductible.'
The developing trend seems to be toward allowing deductions for
reimbursable casualty losses or business expenses for which the taxpayer
elects not to be reimbursed. However, these deductions may still be limited
to the above situations.
B-2.05 Casualty Loss - Diamond Rings
In Kielts v. Commissioner,112 the Tax Court was confronted with the
issue of whether the loss of a diamond from a ring caused by an unknown
event was a deductible loss under Code section 165(c) (3). Taxpayers, Mr.
and Mrs. Theodore Kielts, owned a 2.47 carat diamond mounted in a ring
worn by Mrs. Kielts. Theodore Kielts cleaned the ring several times a year
and at least every eighteen months had a jeweler check the mounting. One
day as Mrs. Kielts was writing a check at the grocery store, the absence of
the stone was noticed. Although she had seen the stone within the hour,
an extensive search was unsuccessful. An examination of the mounting re-
vealed two prongs missing and damage to the claws on the opposite side.
However, Mrs. Kielts could not identify any specific event that might have
so damaged her ring and caused the stone to be missing.
The Kielts claimed a casualty loss under section 165(c)(3). The
Commissioner disallowed the loss stating that the taxpayer must be able
to identify the event that caused the loss. The Commissioner relied on
White v. Commissioner'13 as a basis for claiming that the event causing the
casualty must be identifiable.
In finding for the taxpayer, the Tax Court employed the doctrine of
3e0 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81, 172 at 556 (1981).
'l Id. at 557.
.62 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,329 at 1157 (1981).
168 48 T.C. 430 (1967). In White a car door slammed on the taxpayer's hand and caused a
diamond to be lost in a gravel driveway.
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ejusdem generis to construe the phrase "other casualty" in section 165(c)
(3)." Early interpretations of this phrase required casualties similar in
nature to fire, storm or shipwreck. In later decisions, however, the phrase
was applied to "accidental losses caused by sudden and unexpected force." '165
In Kielts, the Tax Court stated, "[i]t is not necessary to pinpoint the exact
moment of the loss when, as here, some precipitating event must have oc-
curred. . . ."'I' The physical condition of the ring established that a force-
ful blow had taken place and that the specific event causing the damage
was not identifiable was held not to be fatal to the taxpayer's deducted loss.
The Tax Court stated that "[t]he amount of deductible loss for a casualty
is its adjusted basis, as determined under section 165 (b)," 17 minus the
$100 floor amount of section 165(c)(3).
B-2.06 Rental Property
The Tax Court, in Louise Hudson v. Commissioner,"' reviewed an
IRS determination which resulted in the disallowance of deductions relating
to rental property. Louise Hudson owned rental property in a declining
neighborhood. Rather than rent to undesirable tenants, the taxpayer al-
lowed a rental unit to remain vacant from September 1974, until January
1980, while she looked for acceptable tenants. During this period, the tax-
payer continued to deduct depreciation, expenses, repairs, and a casualty
loss. The IRS took the position that the excessive length of time that the
rental unit remained vacant indicated a lack of a profit motive and, there-
fore, disqualified the taxpayer as a person carrying on a rental property
trade or business as defined in section 162 of the Code."9
In finding for the Commissioner, the court held that the taxpayer, in-
deed, had allowed the unit to remain vacant too long. Yet, the court gave
no guidance as to precisely how long a rental unit could remain vacant and
still qualify under section 162. In light of the fact that the taxpayer in
this case was denied the deduction after a period of vacancy in excess of
five years, taxpayers in a similar situation should take care not to allow their
rental units to exceed, as a maximum, a five-year period of vacancy. However,
under different circumstances, where taxpayer kept careful records and
sought tenants, this time period could vary.'
164 I.R.C. 165(c) (3) states that "[in the case of an individual, the deduction under subsec-
tion (a) shall be limited to ... (3) losses of property not connected with a trade or
business, if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft."
(Emphasis added).
165Kielts v. Commissioner, 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,329 at 1158 (citing White v. Com-
missioner, 48 T.C. 430 (1967) and Popa v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 130 (1979)).
166 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,329 at 1158.
16 7 d, at 1159-60. 168 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,175 at 561 (1981).
l69 Id. at 562. Taxpayer's "shifting stories," lack of substantiation on the claimed rental ex-
pense schedule and the failure to differentiate between the personal and business use of theduplex undoubtedly contributed to the court's finding a lack of a profit motive.
170 Id.
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B-2.07 Medical Expense -Health Spa
The Code provides that an individual can deduct certain medical ex-
penses paid during the year for himself, his spouse, and his dependents."'
As a condition to qualifying for the deduction, the taxpayer must not be
reimbursed through insurance or otherwise. 7 '
In Keen v. Commissioner,' the Tax Court allowed a medical expense
deduction where the taxpayer installed a health spa in his home upon a
doctor's advice. The purpose of the spa was to relieve the taxpayer's wife of
severe arthritic pain.
The court allowed a deduction for the amount by which installation
costs exceeded the amount by which the health spa increased the value
of the taxpayer's residence. Based upon Rev. Rul. 67-76,' the taxpayer
should also be able to deduct maintenance and operating costs of the spa,
as long as it is used for medical care.
B-2.08 Tax Shelter Advice
Ordinarily, attorney's or accountant's fees for tax advice to taxpayers
are deductible. Recently the Tax Court held that costs and, in certain situ-
ations, advice for the acquisition of tax shelters must be capitalized as part of
the cost of obtaining the shelter.
In Honodel v. Commissioner,7 5 taxpayers paid fees for periodic tax
planning sessions in which their personal financial and tax status was re-
viewed and investment programs were proposed. The advisors would also
study and select projects, negotiate the purchase of investments, and pre-
pare the needed legal documentation, including a limited partnership agree-
ment. The projects were then recommended to the taxpayers who had the
option to invest in them.
The Tax Court found a "dual nature" in the advisor's function: "(1) an
advisory function and (2) an acquisition function.' ' 7 The court held that
the fees paid for the periodic advisory services were deductible. However,
the court held that the fees paid for the acquisition of the tax shelters must
be capitalized and that amount added to the basis of the investment. The
court compared these fees to those of a stockbroker which also must be
capitalized.
This holding is in agreement with an IRS Technical Advice Memo-
randum 7 concerning a law firm which researched real estate syndications
and offered to put its client in touch with the syndicators. Its fee included
charges for modification of the partnership documents and research costs.
271 I.R.C. § 213. 172 Id.
'73 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,313 at 1090 (1981).
1?4See Rev. Rul. 67-76, 1967-1 C.B. 70.
'75 Honodel v. Commissioner, 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.26 at 188 (1981).
176 Id. at 197. '" Letter Ruling 8108008 (1980).
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The position of the IRS was that these fees must be capitalized. The Memo-
randum cited Collins v. Commissioner,"8 in which the Tax Court held that
fees paid to an attorney who prepared a contract for purchase of real
estate must be capitalized, but fees paid to a C.P.A. who restructured the
terms in an attempt to have the down-payment classified as prepaid interest
were deductible as tax advice.
A recent IRS Revenue Ruling' is consistent with the above decision.
In the ruling's fact situation, a tax advisor attempted to sell various in-
terests in a limited partnership. The purchaser of the interest was given
either a rebate from the partnership itself or a discount on the purchase
price in an amount comparable to the tax advisor's fee. The IRS ruled
that the purchaser could not deduct the payments made to the tax advisor
because the limited partnership actually paid for the fees. Furthermore, the
partnership could not amortize the payments under section 709(a) because
payments were, in substance, "a commission for the sale of a partnership
interest."1 '
From this, one could extrapolate that a taxpayer may seek advice on
his own tax shelter and the fees are deductible. However, if the advisor
himself presents the shelter to a client, which he is organizing, the fee for
this may need to be capitalized.
B-2.09 Commuting Expense
As a general rule the cost of travel between a taxpayer's residence and
place of business is a nondeductible personal expense. 1 However, where
an employee is required by his employer to transport job-related tools or
materials to and from work, a deductible expense is recognized to the extent
extra cost is incurred above ordinary commuting costs. 2
In McCabe v. Commissioner,8' the Tax Court held that a policeman
is not entitled to deduct extra transportation costs incurred because of the
need to carry a revolver to work. The New York Police Department re-
quired all policemen to be armed when in the city. In order for McCabe to
travel from his suburban residence to New York City on public transit, it
was necessary that he travel through a portion of New Jersey. New Jersey
law "permits officers employed by governmental agencies outside the state
... . to carry weapons in New Jersey only while engaged in official duties
and upon prior notification to local police authorities."'8" As a result, McCabe
had to drive into the city. The policeman sought a deduction for the addi-
17854 T.C. 1656 (1970).
179Rev. Rul. 81-153, 1981-21 I.R.B. 7.
18OId. at 8.
181 Rev. Rul. 56-25, 1956-1 C.B. 152.
182 Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 C.B. 59.
188 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.76 at 473 (1981).
184 Id.
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tional commuting expenses incurred because he was precluded from utilizing
public transportation.
In denying the deduction, the Tax Court held that the additional
commuting expenses were incidentals of the policeman's occupation. The
Court distinguished this case from the situation where a taxpayer is required
by his employer to transport job-related tools to work regardless of where
he lives. The distinction was made that it was the taxpayer's personal choice
to live in an area where the most convenient route to his post was through
New Jersey.1 85
B-3.00 Deductions (Business)
B-3.01 Noncompetition Agreement
In Kalamazoo Oil Co. v. Commissioner,8 the taxpayer, a Michigan
corporation, agreed to pay a retiring fifty percent shareholder $7,000 an-
nually for life in exchange for the shareholders covenant not to compete.
The shareholder, one of the original incorporators, had signed an agreement
with the corporation whereby the corporation had an option to purchase five
percent of his stock per year up to twenty-five percent. The remaining
twenty-five percent of the shareholder's stock would be redeemed after
death.
The Tax Court held that the covenant not to compete was a "paper
promise" designed to provide the corporation with deductions for part of
the cost of buying the shareholder's stock."' Therefore, competition with
the corporation by the shareholder was not in the shareholder's financial inter-
est. The court further looked at the shareholder's age, 64, and the fact that he
intended to and did, in fact, retire. The court noted the possibility of such a
person competing with the corporation seemed very unlikely. Also, the life-long
covenant to compete went beyond what might have been a reasonable time
for competition, if the party involved had been a valid threat to compe-
tition. Therefore, the taxpayer corporation could not deduct as ordinary
business the $7,000 annual payment to the shareholder under the guise
of a covenant not to compete.
B-3.02 Legal Fees
Two 1981 Tax Court decisions dealt with the issue of when legal
fees qualify as a permissible business deduction under the Code.'88 As a
general rule, legal fees expended by a corporation in successfully de-
fending an employee against criminal charges based on corporate conduct
are deductible business expenses. 8
185 d. at 475.
1- 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,344 at 1221 (1981).
1IB Id. 1223.
18S I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976).
189 Union Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 659 (1954):
Fall, 198 1]
29
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1981
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAW REVIEW
In Jack's Maintenance Contractors, Inc. v. Commissioner,9 ' the Tax
Court extended the general rule by holding that a corporation could deduct
legal fees incurred in the defense of its sole shareholder-officer [hereinafter
Jack Farmer] in a tax fraud proceeding which arose out of events alleged
to have taken place before the business was incorporated. In characterizing
the costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses, the court noted
that the corporation's motive in paying the legal fees was to keep itself in
business since Jack Farmer's services were "indispensable" and "irreplace-
able. 191
The Tax Court refused to apply the "origin of the claim test"'92 which
looks to the origin of the claim and determines whether it involved a per-
sonal or business activity or a capital transaction. " 3 The IRS contended that
the litigation arose out of the business activities of Jack Farmer's sole
proprietorship rather than the corporation's business and that therefore the
origin of the claim prevented the deduction. The court rejected this argu-
ment stressing that the issue was not whether the legal expenses were de-
ductible but by whom they were deductible.' Even if Jack Farmer had
been convicted of the criminal charges, his legal expenses should have been
deductible. The Supreme Court has held that expenses of an unsuccessful
criminal defense are deductible where the charges arose in connection with
the taxpayer's trade or business. 95
Van Halften v. Commissioner,'96 also decided by the Tax Court in
1981, held that legal costs expended to defend actions to compel sale of
income producing property are not deductible. Mr. Van Hafften was sued
for breach of contract and specific performance after negotiations broke
down between himself and a prospective buyer of rental property. Legal fees
in successfully defending the suit amounted to $14,000. Van Hefften argued
that the legal fees were incurred for the protection of income producing
property. The IRS contended that the legal fees were non-deductible costs
to property and only increased the property's basis.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and held that amounts expended
for legal fees were capital expenditures and as such could be added to
the basis in the property. In doing so, the court applied the "origin of the
claim test" and determined that the litigation "arose out of the disposition"
of Van Hafften's property.197
190 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,349 at 1235.
191 Id. at 1238.
1
9 2 Id. at 1237.
193 The "origin of the claim" test was developed in United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39(1963), in order to determine whether a legal expense is deductible.
1- 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) V 81,349 at 1237 (emphasis added).
195 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
1" 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.70 at 448 (1981).
197 Id. at 450.
[Vol. 15:2
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/5
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981
These cases make clear that the "origin of the claim" test is still viable.
However, to achieve success, a taxpayer must do more than simply attribute
the desired deduction 98 to an income producing activity. The court will
continue to look to the substance of the matter in making its decision.
B-3.03 Ordinary Living Expenses
The Tax Court decision in Harrison v. Commissioner 9 should result
in new tax planning measures being taken for the benefit of farmer share-
holders and professional corporations through the application of section
119 of the Code. Under section 119, the value of meals and lodging which
are provided to an employee will not be taxable to the employee provided
that the meals and lodging are furnished for the "convenience of the em-
ployer."" °0 The Harrison decision °' indicates that ordinary living costs re-
lated to those meals and lodging may be deductible as ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses.0 2
Harrison Farms, Ltd. (HFL) was formed by two families who in-
corporated their grain and dairy operations. The families both controlled
all the stock and were employees of HFL. Due to the nature of the operation
and its need for round-the-clock supervision, the families were required to
live and eat on the farm. Utility and telephone bills of the employees
were paid by the corporation as well as costs for meals. HFL deducted
the costs of the above items, and the Harrisons utilized section 119 to avoid
being taxed on the value of the meals and utility payments.
The IRS challenged the section 119 exclusions characterizing the
meals and payments received by the Harrisons as dividends. The deductions
taken by HFL were attacked as outside the scope of ordinary and necessary
business expenses and therefore impermissible. The Tax Court held, how-
ever, that since the Harrisons' presence on the farm was required at all
times in order to conduct HFL's business, the cost of the meals and utili-
ties were ordinary and necessary expenses of the corporation. The telephone
expenses were treated as nondeductible dividends but the court said this
was due to the fact that HFL presented no evidence as to the actual use
of the telephone "nor was any allocation presented as to business use and
personal use." '
With regard to the exclusions taken by the Harrisons, the Tax Court
stated that it was "clearly the duty of [the wives of the families] as corporate
employees to obtain the food and prepare and serve meals which HFL pro-
vided all of its employees." 04 The fact that the Harrisons were needed on
the farm on a 24-hour basis in order to conduct corporate business indicated
that the meals and lodging were furnished for the convenience of HFL
198 I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976). 199 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,211 at 691.
100 I.R.C. § 119(a) (1980). 201 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,211 at 698-99.
2 I.R.C. § 162. 203 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) T 81,211 at 699,
9- Id. at 697.
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and that the Harrisons were required to lodge at the farm as a condition
of employment. In effect, for purposes of the section 119 exclusion, the
corporation provided the meals, and the utility expenses were considered a
facet of lodging in that they were necessary to make the employees' homes
habitable.
The significance of Harrison lies in its potential application to other
corporations whose business does not fit a nine-to-five schedule. This decis-
ion should certainly stimulate other farm families to adopt a corporate
form if for no other reason than to obtain these deductions for living ex-
penses. It is doubtful, however, whether a professional corporation, per-
forming legal or medical services, could use the same reasoning.
B-3.04 Interest - Business Purpose
The IRS has ruled that a corporation cannot deduct the ratable share
of the original issue discount on a fifty-year note when the agreement re-
quired a deposit with the lender of 150% of the loan for twenty years.' 5
Under the agreement, the corporation issued a note for $20,000 to the
lender and included with the note a deposit of $30,000 which was to be
returned in twenty years. The note carried a 1.167% interest rate to be
compounded monthly and was callable every two years. The financial plan
was to deduct the total interest expense of $21,083,425 ratably over the
fifty-year period, giving the corporation an annual interest deduction of
$421,668.50. However, the IRS ruled that because of the large deposit
there was no valid indebtedness as required by the rule of Knetsck v. Com-
missioner."° In addition, an interest deduction was not allowed where
there was no substance or purpose behind the transaction except the desire
to obtain the tax benefit of an interest deduction. °7
Another financial plan covered by the revenue ruling was for the cor-
poration to pay for tax planning advice in equal amounts of cash and long-
term indebtedness.0 ' Under this plan the corporation paid $20,000 cash
and issued a fifty-year note for $20,000, which had terms identical to the
note above. The IRS ruled that a business performing services would not
ordinarily accept a fifty-year note as payment and the sole purpose of the
plan was to create interest deductions in excess of what was actually paid.
The ratable interest expense was therefore found not deductible, limiting
the deduction to the amount of cash actually paid for the tax-planning
advice.
B-4.00 Exemptions
B-4.01 Marriage Penalty Tax
In an attempt to focus attention on the inequities of the tax rates for
205 Rev. Rul. 81-149, 1981-21 I.R.B. 5. 200364 U.S. 361 (1960).
207 Rev. Rul. 81-149, 1981-21 I.R.B. at 5 (citing Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734,
741-42 (2d Cir. 1966) as the source of the rule that prevents a deduction in this situation).
mRev. Rul. 81-149, 1981-21 I.R.B. at 5.
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jointly filing taxpayers where both parties are employed, David and Angela
Boyter participated in annual divorces and remarriages. However, the Tax
Court effectively blocked this method of circumventing the payment of
additional tax in Boyter v. Commissioner."9
Mr. and Mrs. Boyter, residents of Maryland, filed joint returns from
when they were married in 1966 through 1974. Upon discovery that their
tax rate would be lower if each filed as a single person, the Boyters de-
termined to obtain a year-end divorce in a foreign country. In December,
1975, Mrs. Boyter, appearing personally, obtained a Haitian divorce. Mr.
Boyter, through a Haitian attorney, filed a submission to Haitian juris-
diction. In January, 1976, the Boyters remarried in Maryland. The follow-
ing November, Mr. Boyter, appearing personally, and his wife, by attorney,
received a divorce in the Dominican Republic. In February of 1977, a
Maryland marriage certificate was issued to the parties. The Boyters con-
tinued to live together during this entire period. In both 1975 and 1976,
they filed and paid their taxes based on their status as single persons.
The IRS objected to this procedure, stating that the divorces were
mere sham transactions designed only to avoid taxes. The matter was taken
to the Tax Court where the issue was whether the Boyters were entitled to
fie as single individuals, i.e. whether the divorces granted by Haiti and the
Dominican Republic were entitled to recognition by the IRS. 1°
The court began its analysis by conceding that "for Federal income
tax purposes, the determination of the marital status of the parties must
be made in accordance with the law of the state of their domicile. '2 1' This
is in keeping with the long held tradition that domestic relations are a "virtu-
ally exclusive province of the States. 2 1 2 However, since Maryland courts
have never ruled on the question of the validity of foreign divorces, the
Tax Court found it necessary to determine how that state's highest court
would have ruled if it had been presented with the question.1
The court recognized the rule that "the domicile of at least one of
the spouses is necessary in order for a divorce decree rendered by one state
of our Federal system to be accorded compulsory recognition by all of the
other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." 1' The court found
that for recognition of the validity of a foreign2 19 divorce under the principles
of comity, the minimum requirement is that at the time it is awarded at
2" 74 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 74.72 at 536 (1980). The status of the taxpayer is to be
determined at the end of the tax year according to I.R.C. § 143(a).
210 74 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 74.72 at 538.
2111 d. at 539.
212Id. citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
213 74 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. T 74.72 at 539 citing Estate of Basch, 387 U.S. 456, 465
(1967).
21474 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 74.72 at 540.
215 Foreign in this context refers to outside the country.
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least one of the parties must be a domiciliary of that country.216 This was
not the case here. As was openly stated during the foreign proceedings,
both Mr. and Mrs. Boyter, at all times, were domiciled in Maryland.
Boyters argued that the IRS "should not be allowed to attack the
validity of the foreign divorces in Tax Court because such an attack is
proper only where there are conflicting judicial decrees regarding the tax-
payers' marital status.""7 The court disagreed stating that since Congress
set up different tax rates according to marital status, the IRS had both
the right and the duty to determine that status. The court was convinced
that Maryland, in spite of the participation of both parties, would not have
recognized these divorces, and, therefore, that the taxpayers were not en-
titled to file as single individuals. This finding is clearly in accord with and
strengthens past rulings.21 '
One of the changes contained in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 somewhat reduces the tax burden on the two wage earner family
by allowing a five percent deduction on the earnings of the lower paid
spouse in 1982, and ten percent in subsequent years. This is to be an
amount equal to the lesser of $3,000 or the qualified earned income of
the lower paid spouse. 19 This will serve to aid some families but not those
where both spouses are earning above average salaries.
B-5.00 Tax Credits
B-5.01 Investment Credit - Leases
In Loewen v. Commissioner,"' the Tax Court ruled that a change
in business form from unincorporated to incorporated does not force a re-
capture of investment tax credit if substantially all assets necessary to
operate the business are transferred to the corporation. Taxpayers George
and Selma Loewen formed a corporation to which they transferred sub-
stantially all assets of their farming and cattle-feeding business. The real
property and fixtures were leased and not transferred to the corporation.
Prior to the incorporation, taxpayers had received investment tax credit
under section 38. The Commissioner ruled the investment tax credit was
subject to recapture under section 47.
In overruling the Commissioner, the Tax Court pointed to section 47 (b)
which exempts recapture if there is a "mere change in the form of con-
ducting the trade or business... ."I' Further, the court looked to Regu-
lation 1.47-3 (f)( 1 ) which sets out four conditions to be met for recapture
216 74 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 74.72 at 540.
217 Id.
218 Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40.
219 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172 (amending
I.R.C. § 221).
20 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.5 at 49 (1981).
22 1I.R.C. § 47(b).
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exemption.22 The parties agreed that three of the conditions were met.
In dispute was the fourth condition which states that it will be met if "(s)ub-
stantially all the assets . . .necessary to operate such trade or business are
transferred .... "2I Substantially all the assets were transferred in this case
and furthermore, the court noted, "special circumstances existed that pre-
vented the transfer of the real property to the corporation."2 '
The court referred to the fact that the object of section 47 is to pre-
vent a quick turnover of assets in an effort to receive multiple tax credits.
This case presented no such danger because if the property were sold, re-
capture would then occur.2
B-5.02 Investment Credit - Indefinite Lease with Option to Cancel
In Ridder v. Commissioner,2 the Tax Court held that taxpayer's open-
end lease with options for either party to cancel, did not satisfy the require-
ments for an investment tax credit. Taxpayer, a noncorporate lessor, purch-
ased a truck with a useful life of six years and thereafter claimed an in-
vestment credit based on the truck's status as section 38 property. The
truck was immediately leased to taxpayers' employer and was destroyed
in an accident just over one year later. The Tax Court disallowed the in-
vestment tax credit under section 46(e) (3) (B) because the lease term was
more than fifty percent of the truck's useful life. That section allows such a
deduction only if "the term of the lease (taking into account options to
renew) is less than fifty percent of the useful life of the property.""2 ,
The taxpayer contended the term of the lease was controlled by the
actual time of the truck's existence and therefore use. The Commissioner
and the Tax Court said that the language of the lease must control. The
language of the lease showed an intention for the lease to run for the truck's
useful life, with options for either party to cancel.2 Absent a specification
that the lease would end in three years, options to cancel the lease were
insufficient to satisfy section 46(e) (3) (b)'s specific language that the lease
must be for less than fifty percent of the property's useful life for an invest-
ment tax credit to be allowed.
Taxpayers should note that the useful lives of equipment have under-
gone a revision with the new tax Act.2 Under the new Act, the taxpayer's
truck would probably be considered "5-year property" ' because it had a
222 Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3(f)(1) (1967). 223Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3(f)(1)(ii)(c) (1967).
22476 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.5 at 50, n. 2. The court was referring to the Kansas
restriction regarding corporate ownership of farm land.
225 Id. at 50.
226 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.75 at 468 (1981).
2271.R.C. § 46(e)(3)(B).
228 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.75 at 472, n.9.
229Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172 (amending
I.R.C. § 168).
80 Id. § 201(c)(2)(B).
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present class life of six years. 31 If a truck is 5-year property by reason of the
new Act, to qualify for the investment tax credit under the Ridder decision,
a lease should specify a term of less than 2 years, i.e., less than fifty per-
cent of its useful life.
B-5.03 Investment Credit - Landlord/Tenant
There is a specific restriction in the Code that "property which is used
predominantly to furnish lodging . . . shall not be treated as section 38
property."2 The effect of this restriction is that the investment credit nor-
mally available for depreciable property is not allowed for property used in
this manner. The IRS issued a new revenue ruling 3 clarifying this in re-
gard to a person whose business is the leasing of furniture. Under the new
ruling, when furniture is leased to owners of a building who use the furniture
for short term tenancies, the credit is not allowed. However, if the lessor
leases directly to the tenants, he qualifies for the credit. The rationale for
allowing the tax credit for furniture in this case was that "tenants do not
furnish lodging to themselves" 3' within the meaning of the Code. This
ruling revoked an earlier ruling3 5 which disallowed the investment credit
in either situation.
Persons in the business of leasing furniture should weigh the ad-
vantages of gaining the credit by leasing directly to the tenant with the
benefit of leasing to a potentially more financially responsible apartment
corporation.
B-6.00 Depreciation - Depletion
B-6.01 Oil/Gas Depletion - Bonus
According to two recent Tax Court holdings, a taxpayer must have
received the income from an actually producing oil or gas well in order to
take a percentage depletion allowance deduction against gross income. In
Engle v. Commissioner,"0 the taxpayer claimed a depletion allowance
against advance royalties he had received from the assignment of two oil
and gas wells. The court stated:
Prior to 1975, it was well settled that the recipient of advance roy-
alties (i.e. royalties paid in advance of the actual production of a min-
eral) under an oil and gas lease was entitled to compute depletion on
the basis of both the cost method and the percentage method and to
deduct the greater of the two amounts ... "'I
However, the court explained that the Tax Reduction Act of 197538 added
281 The Asset Depreciation Range (A.D.R.) tables show a range of five to seven years for the
present class life of a heavy truck. A light truck is given a present class life of three to five
years and could therefore be considered "3 year property." Id. § 201(c) (2) (A) i).
232I.R.C. § 48(a)(3). 233 Rev. Rul. 81-133, 1981-18 I.R.B. 5.
i
341d. (emphasis in original). 235 Rev. Rul. 78-438, 1978-2 C.B. 10.
236 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.78 at 493 (1981).
2
3
7 Id. at 494. 2S8 Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26.
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section 613A to the Code which eliminated percentage depletion except for
independent producers in certain specified instances. The amount of the
permitted allowance was tied to the "average daily production" of the well,
and formula for measuring the amount was included." 9
In Engle, there was no production and the court reasoned that the ex-
ception was therefore not applicable. However, the taxpayer was still found
eligible to deduct cost depletion. The court stated "[i]n our view, the fact
that section 613A (c) was written into the Internal Revenue Code as a
limited exception to the general repeal of percentage depletion for oil and
gas militates against giving that section an expansive and extraordinary in-
terpretation."2 '
Using the same rationale, the court found in Glass v. Commissioner,"'
that no percentage depletion deduction should be allowed for the amounts
received by taxpayer as a bonus for giving the right to explore for oil and
gas on his property. Again, however, these payments were available for a
deduction figured on the cost depletion method. The court said the reason
for this was because "the bonus payments are paid and retained, regardless
of whether oil or gas is found.2 42
Again, the court said actual production had to be present to permit
percentage depletion. Since the statute's formula for determining the al-
lowable amount varies depending on the mineral found and other factors,
there would be no practical method to ascertain the appropriate mode
before production.
One of the purposes of the depletion allowance is to encourage ex-
ploration and exploitation of energy resources. However, since it is indi-
rectly the American taxpayer who is subsidizing this effort, and since there
have been abuses in the past creating political furor, the court is wise
to read the statute as strictly as it has and to require actual production.
B-6.02 Depreciation - Avocado Trees
Avocado trees, like income-producing citrus trees43 and seed timber, "
are now considered depreciable assets 4 ' qualifying for an investment credit
if the taxpayer can establish that the tree's useful life is more than three
years. In a decision rendered in 1950, the Tax Court held that avocado trees
were not subject to depreciation because they have an indeterminate pro-
ductive life.246 There was testimony in the 1950 case that avocado trees
239 I.R.C. § 613A(c).
240 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.78 at 499-500.
24176 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.79 at 511 (1981).
242 Id. at 515 (quoting Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 111 (1932)).
248 Rev. Rul. 65-104, 1965-1 C.B. 28.
244 Rev. Rul. 78-264, 1978-2 C.B. 9.
245 Letter Ruling 8108007 (1981).
2" Krome v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 50,064 at 159.
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produce for two hundred years or more and that production increases as
the trees mature. It was this factor which seemingly caused the IRS to state
that the trees do not, therefore, depreciate in value.4 7
However, this was a memo decision rendered before the investment
credit of section 38 was enacted. Subsequent revenue rulings" ' have held
that "citrus trees, trees of fruit orchards or groves, macadamia trees and
trees of a seed orchard . . . are 'section 38' property. Since the definition
of 'section 38 property' includes the requirement that a deduction for de-
preciation must be allowable with respect to the property,"2 '9 it follows
that the avocado trees may be depreciated. The useful life of the tree is
measured from the point where the tree becomes income producing or when
it first bears (fruit) in sufficient quantity to be harvested and marketed in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business. 5 This ruling attempts to
end an artificial distinction between avocado and other fruit growers and
to recognize the reality that avocado growers have been depreciating their
trees over a twenty-year period.
B-7.00 Gains and Losses
B-7.01 Nonrecognition - Gold/Silver
Section 1031 provides that no gain or loss is recognized when property
held for investment is exchanged solely for property of a like kind. Dis-
putes over the application of section 1031 (a)'s nonrecognition provision
center on the definition of like kind exchange. The treasury regulations pro-
vide that "the words 'like kind,' as used in Section 1031(a) of the Code,
have reference to the nature or character of the property and not to its
grade or quality. One kind or class of property may not.., be exchanged
for property of a different kind or class." '251
The Service held in Revenue Ruling 79-143152 that the exchange of
United States twenty dollar collector gold coins (numismatic-type coins) for
South African Krugerrand and gold coins (bullion-type coins) did not
qualify as a like kind exchange. The IRS noted that the value of numis-
matic coins are determined by their age, number minted, and metal content,
while the value of bullion coins is determined solely by its metal content.
Numismatic coins represent an investment in the coins themselves while
bullion coins represent an investment in gold on world markets. Following
this reasoning, the Service concluded that the coins in question were not
of the same nature or character, and therefore, were not property of a
like kind.
247 Id. at 170.
248Rev. Rul. 78-264, 1978-2 C.B. 9; Rev. Rul. 71-488, 1971-2 C.B. 60; Rev. Rul. 69-249,
1969-1 C.B. 31; Rev. Rul. 67-51, 1967-1 C.B. 68; Rev. Rul. 65-104, 1965-1 C.B. 28.
24B Letter Ruling 8108007 (1980).
25ORev. Rul. 78-264, 1978-2 C.B. 9.
258 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (1965). 252Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1 C.B. 264.
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However, in a 1981 Letter Ruling," the IRS stated that the exchange
of gold bullion bars for their dollar equivalent of the bullion-type South
African Krugerrand gold coins constituted an exchange solely for property
of like kind. Revenue Ruling 79-143... and this letter ruling can be dis-
tinguished by the fact that the latter involved only the exchange of bullion
bars for bullion-type coins.
It can be seen from these rulings that the Service continues to stress
the nature, character, or class of the property rather than its grade or quality
in determining whether a transaction qualifies for nonrecognition of gain
as a like kind exchange under section 1031.
B-8.00 Procedure
B-8.01 Tax Preparer Penalties
Understatement of a taxpayer's liability may subject preparers to two
types of penalties. Negligent or intentional disregard of rules and regula-
tions relevant to determining a taxpayer's correct tax liability subjects a
preparer to a one-hundred dollar penalty. A five-hundred dollar penalty
may be levied against a preparer for willful understatement of tax liability."'
These penalties are in addition to criminal penalties which may be applied
for certain fraudulent acts. 5 ' The treasury regulations state that a preparer
has not negligently or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation if he
has exercised due diligence in an effort to apply the rules and regulations
to the information given to him to determine a taxpayer's correct liability.""
In a 1979 Letter Ruling, 8 the IRS held that a preparer who failed to com-
pute the minimum tax on certain tax preference items was subject to liability
under section 6694(a). The burden of proof is on the preparer to show
that he exercised due diligence in applying the rules and regulations to the
information supplied by the taxpayer. However, "the Service must make an
affirmative showing of the reason for which the penalty is asserted. It is not
sufficient to merely find that the preparer has made a mistake." '
Three criteria are used by the IRS to determine whether or not a pen-
alty for tax preparer's negligence is warranted. These are set forth in Revenue
Procedure 80-40."' They are the nature of the error causing the under-
statement of tax, the frequency of errors and the materiality of errors. In
reviewing the nature of the error causing the understatement of tax, the IRS
will consider whether the misapplied provision was so complex or uncom-
mon that the preparer might have reasonably applied it in an incorrect
manner, and whether the preparer could have detected the error through a
253Letter Ruling 8117053 (1981).
25I.R.C. § 6694(a). 255I.R.C. § 6694(b). 2eI.R.C. § 7206(2).
257Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(1) (1977).
258 Letter Ruling 8001007 (1979). See also Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1980,
14 AKRON L. REv. 267, 287 (1980) relating to a similar IRS holding in Rev. Rul. 80-28,
1980-1 C.B. 304.
250 Letter Ruling 8001007. 280 1980-40 I.R.B. 22.
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general review of the return.26' In determining the materiality and frequency
of errors, the IRS will penalize the preparer if a pattern of errors or an
obvious error is found.262
In light of Revenue Procedure 80-40, a preparer should consider de-
veloping a check list for his use to insure that nothing is overlooked. If a
preparer can demonstrate that his office procedure is calculated to promote
accurate returns, the IRS will be less likely to assert the penalty. If possible,
prior returns of the taxpayer should be reviewed so that the preparer can
be aware of possible problem areas.
The Code provides that a person is not an income tax return preparer
if he merely furnishes typing, reproducing, or other mechanical assistance
to a taxpayer.262 In light of this provision, an individual who owned a micro-
computer and who intended to rent it to taxpayers, requested a ruling from
the Service as to whether he would be an income tax return preparer under
such circumstances."6 ' The computers were self-explanatory and informed
the taxpayers how to make each entry in a Form 1040 or Form 1040A
return.
The treasury regulations provide that a person who furnishes a tax-
payer or another preparer sufficient information and advice so completion
of a return is largely a mechanical or clerical matter is considered an in-
come tax return preparer.65 Relying on the above regulation, the IRS held
that the rental of the computers by the individual would qualify him as an
income tax return preparer with respect to the returns made therefrom be-
cause "substantive decisions are made by you (the computer owner) when
the computer indicates line by line what entries are to be made on the
form.
2 66
An income tax preparer may be penalized one hundred dollars for
each return which understates the tax liability of the taxpayer because of
the preparer's negligent or intentional disregard of tax rules or regulations. 6 "
In Revenue Ruling 81-17128 a taxpayer's return indicated a net operating
loss as a result of the preparer's negligent or intentional overstatement of
the taxpayer's expenses. Based on the net operating loss carryback the
preparer submitted amended returns for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978,
and claimed refunds for those years. A second preparer prepared the tax-
payer's return for the following year and claimed a net operating loss carry-
forward. The second preparer was not aware of the first preparer's over-
statement of expenses and claimed the carryforward on the basis of in-
261 Id. 262 Id.
MI.R.C. § 7701(a)(36)(B).
2e4 Letter Ruling 8111071 (1981).
2eSTreas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(1) (1977).
2MeLetter Ruling 8111071 (1981).
267I.R.C. § 6694(a). 268 1981-25 I.R.B. 19.
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formation presented to him by the taxpayer. The net operating loss deduc-
tion was a substantial portion of that return.
The IRS ruled that the Code's penalty for understating tax liability
may be separately applied to other taxable year returns affected by the pre-
parer's negligent or intentional disregard of rules and regulations. Therefore,
the first preparer was subject to penalties for the negligent return, the three
carryback returns, and the carryforward return. It was noted that if the
IRS establishes willfulness on the part of the preparer, the five hundred
dollar willful understatement penalty would apply to each return. The sec-
ond preparer would not be subject to penalty.
Section 6695 (f) imposes a five-hundred dollar penalty on an income
tax preparer who endorses or otherwise negotiates a refund check issued
to a taxpayer. Revenue Ruling 80-35 2" represents a shift from the IRS
position that the penalty extends to situations where a preparer negotiates
a check under power of attorney or by reason of the taxpayer's endorsement.
In a fact situation where a business manager-preparer requires each client
to maintain a checking account over which he has a power of attorney to
sign checks upon express authorization of the client, the IRS ruled that the
preparer was not liable under 6695 (f). It reasoned that it was the client
rather than the business manager who negotiated the refund check since
this could be done only as a result of the client's specific instruction.
As a protective measure, preparers who possess a power of attorney to
endorse or negotiate a check should require a client to give written author-
ization to deposit the refund check at the moment the preparer endorses
the check. In this manner, the issue of what constitutes "specific instructions
to deposit a check" does not arise and section 6695(f) liability can be
avoided.
Under each of the aforementioned penalties for understatement of a
taxpayer's tax liability, if the understatement is the result of the actions of
more than one preparer, then each preparer is subject to a separate penalty.
However, where a preparer is penalized under either section 6694 or section
6695, his employer or the partnership of the preparer is not also subject
to penalty unless the employer or partnership participated in the attempt
to understate the tax.' 7
0
B-8.02 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program - Audit
Two circuit courts have determined that taxpayers must comply with
the IRS' Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). In the
recent case of United States v. First National Bank in Dallas,'7 ' the Fifth
Circuit Court agreed with the rationale of the Eighth Circuit in United
269 1980-1 C.B. 305.
37OTreas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(1) (1977). See Letter Ruling 8016099 (1980).
271 635 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981).
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States v. Flagg27 2 and held that I.R.C. section 7602 expressly authorizes the
IRS to issue summons.
First National Bank in Dallas was brought by the bank on behalf of
one of their customers, James A. Yeoham, a physician. Dr. Yeoham had
ordered his financial institutions not to comply with summons issued by
IRS in furtherance of the TCMP. In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit
court examined United States v. Flagg, which involved an attorney who ob-
jected to mandatory participation in the TCMP.
Both of these cases determined that the IRS has the right to issue sum-
mons for an ongoing investigation and that the purpose of that investigation
may properly be data gathering for research.2 73 The IRS considers the ob-
jectives of TCMP to be research and data gathering based on the theory
that this program highlights those areas of tax laws with which taxpayers
are most likely to have difficulty.2 74 The two courts held that cooperation
with the IRS's TCMP is not optional but mandatory and that the IRS has
the statutory right to summon information for that program, even though
the acknowledged goal of the TCMP is to obtain research data.275
Taxpayers considering noncompliance with a TCMP audit should be
forewarned that all district court decisions in their favor have now been
overturned.
B-8.03 Release of IRS Internal Documents
In Taxation with Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Service,27
the District Court for the District of Columbia gave the taxpayer greater
access to IRS documents. The original complaint seeking access to the IRS
records was filed by the Taxation With Representation Fund under the
Freedom of Information Act.2 7  The Plaintiffs sought access to three types
of records: IRS General Counsel's Memoranda, IRS Technical Memoranda
and IRS Actions on Decisions. The IRS General Counsel's Memoranda
were defined by the court to be:
Legal memoranda from the Office of Chief Counsel to the In-
ternal Revenue Service prepared in response to a formal request for legal
advice from the Assistant Commissioner (Technical). . . . G.C.M.'s
are primarily prepared by attorneys in the Interpretative Division of
the Office of Chief Counsel and usually addressed to the Office of the
Assistant Commissioner (Technical) in connection with the review
of proposed private letter rulings, proposed technical advice memo-
randa, and proposed revenue ruling of the IRS.278
272 634 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 49 U.S.L.W. 3788 (1981).
273 635 F.2d at 396, 634 F.2d at 1092.
274 634 F.2d at 1091. 275 635 F.2d at 396.
276 485 F. Supp. 263 (D. D.C. 1980).
2775 U.S.C. § 552 (1967). 278485 F. Supp. at 265.
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The G.C.M.'s include a lengthy legal analysis of issues presented as well
as recommendations based upon the analysis. The second type of record
sought is known as the IRS Actions on Decisions. A.O.D.'s are:
prepared . ..whenever the government loses an issue in a tax case
either in Tax Court or in a federal district court . . . . [T]he A.O.D.
sets forth the issue which was decided against the government, a brief
discussion of the facts and reasoning of the attorney behind his or
her recommendation that the Commissioner either acquiesce or non-
acquiesce in a decision of the Tax Court or of the federal district
court.1
7 1
The final type of record sought was the IRS Technical Memoranda. These
are prepared in connection with a proposed treasury decision. The T.M.:
summarizes or explains the proposed rules provides background in-
formation, states the issues involved, identifies any controversial legal
or policy questions, discusses the approach taken by the draftsperson,
and gives the reasons for the approach.
T.M.'s are indexed, digested, and made available to IRS personnel
in order to assure consistent treatment of taxpayers.S
The district court cited two decisions as compelling disclosure of these
documents. Pies v. Internal Revenue Service,' required disclosure of Tech-
nical Memoranda because they were used as a formal statement on the part
of the IRS. The court extended this reasoning to the General Counsel Memo-
randa and the Actions on Decisions noting that when such a use is made
of these records, they cannot be exempted from disclosure under the Free-
dom of Information Act. A second case, Falcone v. Internal Revenue Ser-
vice,"'2 held that the General Counsel Memoranda were not exempt from
disclosure since they "state current agency interpretations and note where
the proposed ruling may differ." 3 A final factor noted by the district court
in favor of disclosure, was the finding that none of the three types of records
in question were protected by the attorney-client privilege, nor where they
a result of work product. 8"
The holding by the district court may prove very helpful to taxpayers
and their counsel. This is evidenced by the great amount of tax knowledge
made available to the public since 1977 by the release of private letter
rulings. However with the passage of section 701 of the Economic Re-
covery Act of 1981 which allows the Secretary to withhold audit standard
information, it may be that disclosures by the IRS are over.2"
279 Id. at 266-67.
280Id. at 267.
281 484 F. Supp. 930 (D. D.C. 1979).
282 479 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
283 Id. at 988.
284 485 F. Supp. at 268.
285 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 701(a), 95 Stat. 172.
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B-9.00 Pension Profit Sharing and Stock Ownership Plans
B-9.01 Professional Corporation - Pension
Previous decisions286 of the Tax Court held that two professional cor-
porations which formed a fifty-fifty partnership did not have to cover the
partnership's employees under either of the corporations' pension plans be-
cause neither corporation controlled the partnership. The court held 8 7
that the exclusive test for determining whether employees of affiliated en-
tities should be aggregated under the anti-discrimination provisions is the
common control test under section 414(b) and (c).111 This test requires
that a partner hold a greater than fifty percent interest in the partnership to
be considered in control.
However, Congress recently enacted a new law'9 9 which requires that
employees of the members of an affiliated service group shall be treated
as employed by a single employer. An affiliated service group is defined
as an organization plus one or more of the following:
(1) any service organization which is a shareholder or partner in the
above organization and regularly performs services for or with
the above organization, and
(2) any other organization if a significant portion of its business is
the performance of services for any of the above organizations
which would normally be performed by their own employees, and
ten percent or more of the interest of this organization is held
by officers, highly compensated employees, or owners of the above
organizations."'
A recent revenue ruling gives some examples of the application of the
above tests"9' while rendering the two earlier rulings obsolete.92 In one
example corporation S is owned by professional corporations A, owning
eleven percent, and B, owning eight percent. S provides secretarial services
performing one-third for each of A, B and third persons. A and B have
retirement plans which cover only their own employees. Under prior law,
neither A nor B would have to include S's employees in their retirement plans
because neither has control of S. Under the new law, A and S meet the
requirements to be classified as an affiliated service group because A owns
more than ten percent of S which has as a significant portion of its business
the performance of services for A. B, on the other hand, is not included in
286 Garland v. Commissioner, 73 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. V 73.2 at 3 (1979); Kiddie v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1055 (1979).
2s Garland v. Commissioner, 73 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 73.2 at 8.
288I.R.C. § 414(b), (c) (1978).
289 Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 201, 94 Stat. 3521 (adding
I.R.C. § 414(m)).
290I.R.C. § 414(m)(2)(A) & (B).
291 Rev. Rul. 81-105, 1981-12 I.R.B. 27.
292 Rev. Rul. 75-35, 1975-1 C.B. 131; Rev. Rul. 68-370, 1968-2 C.B. 174.
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the affiliated service group because it has a less than ten percent interest in
S. With the control test reduced to ten percent, most organizations will not
be able to eliminate rank and file employees from pension coverage unless
they have a large group of shareholders or partners.
B-9.02 Professional Corporation - Stock Bonus Plan
Section 401 (a) of the Code sets out the requirements for tax qualified
pension, profit sharing and stock bonus plans. One of these requirements
is that the plan be set up so as not to discriminate in favor of certain em-
ployees who are shareholders, officers or highly compensated employees of
the corporation."" In the case of Ralph Gano Miller v. Commissioner,29"
the Tax Court examined the stock bonus plan of a professional law corpo-
ration to determine whether it met this requirement.
The taxpayer's stock bonus plan provided for distribution of the cor-
poration's stock only to a "licensed person under the provision of section
13406 of the California Corporations Code."" Those non-licensed em-
ployees' benefits were to be "distributed in cash, or other assets in kind, pro-
vided no discrimination in value results therefrom.
The court first turned to the Treasury Regulations297 in order to de-
termine the exact nature of a stock bonus plan and the extent to which it
was subject to the requirements of section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The court concluded that all benefits under the stock bonus plan must be
distributed as "stock of the employer company. ' 298 Thus, this plan which
provided for distribution of assets other than stock did not meet the literal
requirement of the Treasury Regulation definition.
Second, the court noted that a plan such as the taxpayer's might allow for
discrimination against non-licensed employees. Congress had required that
plans be non-discriminatory and the court found the plan used in the
Miller case to be in conflict with that intent. The court noted:
Requiring stock bonus plans to distribute benefits in the form of
employer bonus stock appears to be a reasonable means of avoiding
the opportunity for manipulation or discrimination with respect to
the distribution of plan benefits. Put more simply, the requirement
293I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (1974).
29476 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.35 at 232 (1981).
2951d. at 233.
29SId.
29TTreas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(iii) (1960) reads:
A stock bonus plan is a plan established and maintained by an employer to provide
benefits similar to those of a profit-sharing plan, except that the contributions by the
employer are not necessarily dependent upon profits and the benefits are distributable
in stock of the employer company. For the purpose of allocating and distributing the
stock of the employer which is to be shared among his employees or their beneficiaries,
such a plan is subject to the same requirements as a profit-sharing plan. (Emphasis
added).
298 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 1 76.35 at 234.
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to distribute benefits in the form of employee stock is the seal which
makes the employee's benefit airtight. -90
The conclusion reached by the court was that the congressional intent of
section 401 required that stock of the employer be the only property to be
distributed to all qualified employees in order for a non-discriminatory
stock bonus plan to exist.
B-9.03 Partnerships - Keogh Deductions
The Tax Court in Arkin v. Commissioner"' decided that since the
Keogh deductions limitation is determined on the partnership level and not
the partner level, a partnership may under certain circumstances have two
fiscal years and a partner may receive two deductions in one income tax
return.
In Arkin, the law partnership had a normal fiscal year ending on
March 31st. On December 31, 1975 the partnership was terminated. The
partner/taxpayer deducted $7,500 for the contribution made by the part-
nership for the first taxable year, up to March 31st. In its fiscal year ending
on December 31st, the partnership again contributed the maximum of $7,500
then allowed under a Keogh plan, which the partner/taxpayer also de-
ducted. The taxpayer was allowed this $15,000 Keogh deduction by the
Tax Court.
The court decided that limitation on deductible amounts applies not
to the individual/taxpayer but to the partnership. Under the treasury regu-
lations for section 404(e) the amount deductible depends on the taxable
year of the employer."°' Based upon another regulation, an employer clearly
includes a partnership." 2 The court reasoned that in this case, there were
two fiscal years for the partnership even though the same partner received,
in effect, a double deduction.
Whether this decision will be extended to a change in form, such as
a sole-proprietorship to a professional corporation, with a Keogh deduction
followed by a corporate pension deduction, remains to be determined. Also,
it is doubtful whether a court would uphold similar deductions where the
Keogh employer had a history of terminations.
B-10.00 Corporations
B-10.01 Attribution - Family Hostility
The Tax Court ruled in Metzgar Trust v. Commissioner,93 that hostility
among members of a family will not nullify the attribution rules of section
318. This decision conflicts with Halt Trust v. IRS, °4 in which the First
299 d. at 235. 300 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.87 at 567 (1981).
301 Treas. Reg. § 1.404(e)-lA(c) (1979).
302Treas. Reg. § 1.404(e)-lA(f) (1979).
30376 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.3 at 21 (1981).
304510 F.2d 43 (lst Cir. 1975).
(Vol. 15:2
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/5
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981
Circuit court held that the attribution rules may be disregarded if there is
family hostility.
In Haft Trust, the First Circuit viewed the attribution rules as creating
a presumption of continuing influence over corporate affairs. In that case,
a corporation redeemed stock held in trust for a shareholder's children.
This redemption followed a bitter divorce. The First Circuit ruled that
because the continuing influence was not present, the distribution would
not be treated as a dividend. The IRS subsequently issued Revenue Ruling
80-2605 stating it would not follow the Haft Trust decision.
In Metzger Trust,3' the Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner and
held that the family attribution rules would still apply because the plain
language of the statute made no exception for family hostility. The Tax
Court noted that the legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended
to provide precise standards whereby a taxpayer may be considered as
owning stock. Therefore, the redemption distribution in this case was treated
as a dividend.
B-10.02 Reallocation - Evasion of Taxes
Section 482 of the Code permits the income of certain trades and busi-
nesses to be reallocated by the Secretary in order to clearly reflect their
true income. In National Securities Corporation v. Commissioner, "' the
court examined the predecessor of this section and noted that it was:
directed to the correction of particular situations in which the strict
application of the other provisions of the act will result in a distortion
of the income of affiliated organizations. In every case in which the
section is applied, its application will necessarily result in an apparent
conflict with the literal requirements of some other provision of the
act.308
In Ruddick Corp. v. United States,"°' a recent Court of Claims decision,
however, it was determined that absent tax evasion or tax avoidance as a
purpose of the taxpayer, section 482 could not be used to reallocate income.
In Ruddick, the taxpayer was the parent of a stock brokerage firm, R. S.
Dickerson and Co. (RSD), as the result of a corporate reorganization.
Ruddco, Inc. was a wholly owned subsidiary of RSD and owned portfolio
stock. Prior to the reorganization which created Ruddick, RSD directed
Ruddco to distribute its portfolio stock to RSD as a dividend in kind. 1'
Following the reorganization, Ruddick "directed the sale to outsiders by
RSD of the portfolio stock that had been distributed to RSD by Ruddco. '' 1
At the time the portfolio stock was sold, Ruddco was a prospering corpo-
ation to whom any gain from said sale would have been taxable income.
305 1980-1 C.B. 67. 306 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.3 at 32,
307 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1943). 308 137 F.20 at 602,
80949 U.S.L.W. 2619 (Ct. C1. 1981). 810 Id.
B21 Id.
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RSD, on the other hand, had carried forward a large operating loss against
which it applied the gain from the sale of stock. The government reallocated
the gains so as to cause Ruddick, as RSD's parent and successor, to pay a
tax deficiency.
While on its surface, this may seem to be the ideal situation for the
application of section 482, the existence of one more factor was considered
by the Court in disallowing the use of that section. That is, Ruddick needed
the net capital the stock portfolio provided to satisfy the requirements of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and Mid-West Stock Exchange.
Since this business purpose was the motivating factor in the transfer of the
stock, "the commissioner may not use his power of reallocation under §
482 to change or modify, on the ground of income distortion, a transaction
that Congress has seen fit to authorize specifically in spite of the fact that
transaction may well embody some sort of income distortion." 1 ' This led
to the final conclusion that some tax evasion purpose must be evident be-
fore the power granted by section 482 may be used.
B-10.03 Capitalization - Business Expansion
The Fourth Circuit held that intangible costs of expanding a business
must be matched against the benefits derived and the year in which those
benefits are derived will determine whether such costs are current expenses
or future expenses which must be capitalized.
In NCNB Corporation v. United States,313 the taxpayer was a national
bank, North Carolina National Bank (NCNB), which was involved in ex-
panding its business by opening new branch banks. Various expenditures
connected with expansion were under consideration by the court. Two of
those expenditures were marketing studies the bank had prepared or purch-
ased, to assist in deciding the locations of its contemplated new branches.
The bank deducted the full amount of these studies as current expenses.
The Commissioner claimed that these costs were associated with the pro-
duction of future income and therefore must be deducted in the future.
The district court's decision for the taxpayer was based on the fact that none
of the expenditures under consideration created a "separate and distinct
asset." '14
However, the circuit court insisted that an attempt must be made to
match the expenditures against projected benefits. If those benefits could
be realized in the current year, a current expense deduction, pro rata or
fully, is allowable. But the court said, when benefits accrue in the future, the
expenses must be matched with the future benefits, causing the expenses
to be capitalized. In this way, the court maintained, current income can be
more accurately reflected.313
S12 Id. 313 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981).
324 Id. at 947. 825 Id. at 962.
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The vigorous and well-reasoned dissent by Judge Widener must be
noted. Judge Widener quoted from Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings &
Loan Ass'n., 18 wherein the Supreme Court said, "the presence of an en-
suing benefit that may have some future aspect is not controlling; many ex-
penses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year. "17
Whether this Fourth Circuit opinion will be followed by the other
circuits bears observation. The Fourth Circuit's insistence that expenditures
be matched with anticipated benefits to determine in what year a deduction
may be taken forces taxpayers in that circuit to make an allocation of current
benefits and future benefits for tax deduction purposes.
B-10.04 Recapitalization Without Recognition of Gain or Loss
In a recent letter ruling,.. 8 the IRS allowed tax-free treatment, without
section 306 taint, for a corporate division outside of section 355 that coupled
with a stock recapitalization not governed by section 368. 11' In the factual
situation given, Father, Mother, and Child, or A, B, and C respectively,
owned all of the outstanding shares of Company. Because A wanted to
transfer Company's businesses to his sons, it was proposed that each would
be separated into a distinct corporation. However, one of the two manu-
facturing businesses operated by the Company had been in operation for
less than five years so separation and recapitalization under sections 368
(a) ( 1 ) (D) and 355 was not possible."' 0
Under the proposed plan, Company would change its name to Cor-
poration with each share of Company stock automatically converting to
Corporation common stock. Corporation would then organize X and Y.
C would acquire, for cash, all of the shares of X common stock, and Cor-
poration would transfer certain of its assets to X in exchange for X pre-
ferred stock. D (another child) would acquire all of the shares of Y com-
mon stock for cash, and Corporation would transfer the remainder of its
assets to Y in exchange for Y preferred stock. Some preferred stock of both
X and Y was to be held by Corporation under a contingency arrangement
subject to a determination of the fair market value of the transferred assets.
This would result in Corporation owning as its only assets all the preferred
stock in both X and Y, 21 with A, B, and C continuing to own all of Cor-
poration's common stock. By prearrangement, C and D would then purchase
10403 U.S. 345 (1971).
817 Id. at 354, quoted in instant case 651 F.2d at 964 (Widener J., dissenting). Lincoln Sav-
ings and Loan concerned a statutorily created reserve fund. Regulatory authorities mandated
that the fund be treated as an asset.
3 Letter Ruling 8016075 (1980).
819 Metz and Yang, Recent Letter Ruling Okays Unique Split-up and Recap Technique with
No Section 306 Taint, 55 J. TAx 14 (1981).
$20ld. at 14.
821 Because the question was not raised, the IRS did not rule on corporation's status as a
personal holding company.
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A's stock in Corporation over a period of fifteen years. In addition, A and
B intend to make annual gifts to C and D of their shares in Corporation in
amounts of $6,000 to each.3 2 2
The IRS ruled that pursuant to section 351(a), no gain or loss would
be recognized by Corporation, C, or D upon the transfers of property or
cash to the new corporations in exchange for stock. The basis of the assets
of X and Y would have the same basis as that of Corporation immediately be-
fore the exchange. Furthermore, none of the stock issued was to be classified
section 303 stock. Representations by A, B and C upon which this ruling was
based significantly include the conditions that Corporation X and Y not
be liquidated, as a part of the transaction, and that none of Corporation's
transferred assets had been received in a tax-free transaction.
This ruling indicates that the IRS has relaxed its position on what
will be classified as section 306 stock. 23 In the past, any stock, preferred
as to dividends and liquidations, could be classified as 306 stock. It now
seems that the IRS will examine whether there is real potential for converting
ordinary income into capital gains without dilution of control by the sale of
dividend stock before so designating the stock. This is more in line with
the original purpose of section 306 which was to prevent preferred stock
bailouts.
B-10.05 Installment Obligation Exception
The Tax Court and the Tenth Circuit have held that although a tax-
payer does not characterize certain transactions as installment obligations
for section 453 income reporting purposes, this does not prevent the tax-
payer from characterizing the same transactions as installment obligations
in order to recognize a loss in a section 337 corporation liquidation. In
Liberty National Bank and Trust Company v. Commissioner,"' the bank,
acting in accordance with a trust agreement, liquidated an accrual basis
corporation under section 337. The corporation's accounts and notes re-
ceivable were sold at a $50,000.00 loss.
Section 337 generally provides for the nonrecognition of gain or loss
to a corporation that distributes all of its assets during the twelve months
after the start of its planned complete liquidation, with certain exceptions.
One such exception which will result in the recognition of gain or loss
concerns installment obligations. Under section 337(b) (1) (B) these are
defined out of the term "property" for the non-recognition purposes of
section 337(a).
The taxpayer trustee-bank in Liberty National Bank and Trust Com-
A2 This represents the amount a husband and wife could gift annually without gift tax conse-
quences prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
823 Metz and Yang, supra note 319, at 15.
824 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 79.074 at 309, af'd, 650 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir.' 1981).
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pany, deducted the $50,000.00 loss taken on its client's receivables. The Com-
missioner contended that since these receivables were not treated as in-
stallment obligations for income reporting purposes under section 453, the
same transactions could not now be characterized as installment obligations
for purposes of recognizing a deductible loss in a corporate liquidation. The
Commissioner argued that bona fide installment obligations are "periodic
payments spread out over a period of time, and reported in the manner
permitted by section 453 .131
The Tax Court disagreed. In affirming that decision, the court pointed
out that section 453 reporting is not mandatory, and as such a decision
to refrain from characterizing installment obligations according to section
453 is not dispositive as to the existence of the obligations.
The fact that a taxpayer elects not to use the method of reporting
permitted by section 453 does not necessarily mean that obligations
in the form of trade accounts and notes receivable are not "installment
obligations" as that term is used in section 337(b)(1)(B). 28
This decision places the Tenth Circuit in accord with earlier decisions
of the Ninth Circuit.2 7 It seems that if the Commissioner wants section 453
reporting to be obligatory before section 337's exceptions may be used,
some change in the current law is necessary.
B-10.06 Liquidation Reincorporation - Business Motive
Generally, capital gains treatment is available to shareholders who
receive distributions in excess of their basis in the complete liquidation of
a corporation. However, even if the transactions meet all of the requirements
of section 337, the distributions may receive dividend treatment if substanti-
ally all of the assets of the transferee corporation are transferred to another
corporation which is under the control of the same shareholders. The absence
of a tax avoidance motive in the structure of the "liquidation" does not prevent
the IRS from treating the transaction as a D reorganization per section 368
(a)(1)(D).
In Atlas Tool Co.v. Commissioner,"' the Third Circuit held that once
the statutory tests of section 368(a)(1)(D) are met, the nonstatutory
test does not focus on tax avoidance motive but rather on continuity of
the business. The Ninth Circuit recently agreed with this holding in Rose
v. United States.29 In this case, a husband and wife owned all of the capital
stock of two corporations. One corporation adopted a plan to liquidate
$25650 F.2d at 1177 (emphasis in original).
826 id.
3 27 d. at 1177-1178.
328 614 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 101 S. Ct. 110, (1980). The Fifth Circuit
also concurs in this result. See Davant v. Commissioner 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966) cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
829 640 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1981).
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under Section 337 and transferred all of its assets except cash to the other
controlled corporation. The cash was distributed to the shareholders who
claimed capital gain treatment for this distribution under Section 331.
However, the IRS contended that this transaction also satisfied the require-
ments of Section 368(a) (1) (D), and contended that the distribution was
a dividend. The shareholders argued that because there was no tax avoid-
ance motive, the transaction should be treated as a liquidation. The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the IRS, holding that once a sale and liquidation meet
the technical requirements of section 368 (a) (1) (D), it can be reclassified
as a D reorganization without proving a tax avoidance motive.
It is therefore essential that transactions be examined as a whole to
see whether or not they may be classified as a reorganization as opposed
to a liquidation. Sometimes it will be to the taxpayer's advantage to establish
that a reorganization has taken place, such as when the controlling share-
holder is a corporation which would prefer dividend treatment of the dis-
tributions rather than a capital gains treatment.
B-10.07 Liquidation - Effect of Holidays on Nonrecognition Provision
of Section 337
The Code provides that if a corporation adopts a plan of complete
liquidation, and within twelve months thereof distributes all of its assets
which are not retained to meet claims to its shareholders, then any profits
on the sale of the corporation's assets are not taxable to the corporation.330
The issue of whether or not a corporation is entitled to take advantage of
this nonrecognition provision arises when the last day of the twelve-month
period is a legal holiday or on a weekend. The Code states that any act
is timely if the last day prescribed for accomplishing that act is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday and the act is performed on the following day.3"'
However, the IRS in Revenue Ruling 72-541"' refused to extend the two-
and-one-half month time period under section 267(a) (2) relating to un-
paid expenses and interest with respect to transactions between related tax-
payers to the Monday following the weekend which closed the time periods
only in situations where an act is required by internal revenue law to be
performed on or before a prescribed date or within a prescribed period.
The IRS determined that the term "act" as it is used in the Code means
"procedural steps in connection with the determination, collection or refund
of taxes."33
In Atlee D. Snyder, "'4 the Tax Court examined committee reports
and the statutory language relating to section 7503 and held that the IRS
had construed section 7503 too narrowly in Revenue Ruling 72-541. The
Court held that the twelve-month liquidation period referred to in section
830I.R.C. § 337(a) (1976). 831 I.R.C. § 7503. 882 1972-2 C.B. 645.
833 Id. at 646. 334 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,216 at 722.
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337 should be extended to the Monday following the end of the statutory
period.
B-10.08 Preferred Stock - Section 306
Section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code was devised to eliminate
preferred stock "bailout" situations. Prior to its enactment, when a cor-
poration issued preferred stock as dividends two advantages inured to the
shareholder. First, since the preferred stock carried no voting rights, its
subsequent sale did not reduce the shareholder's interest in the growth of
the corporation. Second, the proceeds of the sale were given the more fav-
orable capital gain treatment rather than being subjected to the higher
ordinary income tax rates given cash dividends. This "bailout" was also
common when two classes of stock, one of which was non-voting preferred,
were issued in a recapitalization of a corporation having earnings and
profits. Under section 306, the proceeds from the sale of the preferred
stock issued in both situations would generally be treated as common stock
subject to ordinary income tax in order to prevent the draining off of earn-
ings of the corporation with no proportionate reduction in the shareholder's
interest in corporate growth.
What is "common stock" for purposes of section 306 is not stated in
the Code. Revenue Ruling 81-911" broadens an earlier3 6 interpretation
of what it encompasses. The IRS begins its analysis by viewing the newly
issued stock of a corporation in terms of the "bailout" situation Congress
meant to prevent by section 306. If the stock is "limited and . . . does not
participate in corporate growth to any significant extent"3 7 then the stock
is not common stock under section 306. Stock that in form is in a pre-
ferred position may still be deemed "common" under section 306 if it
encompasses an interest in the unrestricted growth of the corporation.
If it is found to have such an interest, it is not subject to the "bailout"
dangers that section 306 seeks to prevent. Therefore, it will not be subject
to the ordinary income rates upon sale that section 306 stock would be.
The facts in Revenue Ruling 81-91 involve a corporation having a
total of ten shareholders each owning twenty shares of stock. The corpora-
tion was recapitalized, for legitimate business reasons, under a tax-free plan
in which each outstanding share was exchanged for one share of each Class
A and Class B stock. The classes of stock were defined as follows:
Each share of Class A and Class B stock had a par value of 10x
dollars. The Class B shares were entitled to an annual cumulative
dividend of 6 per cent of par value payable before any dividend was pay-
able on Class A shares, and a prior right to repayment up to par value
in the event of liquidation. After the satisfaction of the Class B stock's
preferences, each share of Class A and Class B stock shared equally
s8 1981-12 I.R.B. 5.
338 Rev. Rul. 66-332, 1966-2 C.B. 108. 88, 1981-12 I.R.B. 5.
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as to dividends and on liquidation. Each class of shares carried equal
voting rights and neither class was by its terms redeemable. 88
The preferred stock (class B) had a right to participate in corporate decisions
as well as a right to receive assets upon liquidation equally with the class
A stock. The court stated that "sale of the class B stock cannot occur without
a loss of voting control and interest in the unrestricted growth in the cor-
poration. Therefore, the bailout abuse that Congress sought to prevent by
enactment of section 306 cannot be effected through a sale of the class
B stock." '
By this process of favoring substance over form, the IRS found that
the class B stock was not section 306 stock but, in fact, "common stock."
B-10.09 Loans - Strawman Corporation
In Schlosberg v. United States,"' a limited partnership was formed for
the purpose of constructing and operating an apartment building in Wash-
ington, D.C. At that time, the District's usury laws, which applied both
to individuals and partnerships, permitted lending institutions to charge
corporations a higher rate of interest than that charged partnerships and
individuals. The National Bank of Washington (NBW) required that a
corporation execute the loan documents. This enabled NBW to charge the
higher interest rate. The partnership's general partners and one other person
formed a corporation specifically for this purpose. This new body received
title to the property, executed the loan agreement, and subsequently re-
conveyed the property back to the partnership.
Following completion of the building by the partnership, the straw
corporation was resurrected in order to obtain permanent financing. At
this point, the property was conveyed to the corporation and one loan agree-
ment was signed, followed by the reconveyance of the property to the part-
nership.
The IRS contended that this series of transactions was a sham en-
gaged in by the partnership to preserve its ability to pass deductions to its
members. The partnership admitted it had originally chosen this organiza-
tional form because of its tax advantages. The court agreed that this was a
proper purpose. In this case, because the corporation generated no income,
the contested deductions were of no value to it.
In upholding the right of the partnership to the claimed deductions,
the court looked to the substance rather than the form of the transaction.
"The momentary ownership by the corporation for reasons unrelated to
tax purposes does not mean that the property must be forever deemed tied
88 Id.
39 9d.
840 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) 91 9272 at 86,673 (D. Va. 1981).
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to the corporate form for tax purposes even after it has been reconveyed
to the partnership."3' "
The court further stated that the time in which the property was held
by the corporation was too brief to attribute any payments to it. 42 The
interest on the loans and other expenses were actually paid by the partnership
and, therefore, were deductible by each member participating in it.
B-10.10 Triangular Merger - Loss Carrybacks
In Bercy Industries Inc. v. Commissioner," the surviving corporation
of a triangular merger'' suffered losses which it carried back to offset the
net income of the transferor corporation in its two preceding tax years. The
Commissioner disallowed this carryback and was upheld by the Tax Court. 45
The Ninth District Court of Appeals, agreeing with a prior decision in the
Second Circuit, reversed. 4
The dispute concerned section 381(b) (3) of the Code which limits
post-reorganization loss carry-backs by the surviving corporation of certain
tax-free reorganizations. The government took the position that the legis-
lative intent with regard to section 381 was to prevent carrybacks of post-
reorganization losses when the legal and economic identity of the corpo-
ration has been substantially altered.
The court, however, agreed with the plaintiff's contention that it was
not the intent of Congress to restrict carrybacks in a reorganization which
"generates no complex problems of post-reorganization loss allocation" ''
even though triangular mergers were not specifically covered by the statute.
Rather, the court determined that the intent was merely to prevent un-
manageable administrative problems associated with allocating losses among
entities in these types of mergers. An examination of Senate hearings with
respect to the enactment of Section 381(b) (3) convinced the court that
absent complex allocation problems, there should be no limit on carry-
backs.348
Without determining precisely under which category of reorganization
the triangular merger would qualify the court decided the case in favor of
the corporation and granted the carryback based on a lack of administrative
problems in this factual setting. As the court stated "the indisputable fact
41 Id. at 86,677.
842 ld.
$,3 640 F.2d 1058 (1981).
84A triangular merger is a "transaction in which a subsidiary corporation acquires another
corporation by using the stock of the subsidiary's parent as consideration for the acquisition."
Id. at 1059 n.2 .
845 70 T.C. 29 (1978).
5" Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976).
$,1 640 F.2d at 1061.
348 Id. referring to Hearings on H.R. 3000 before the Senate Finance Committee, 83d Cong.,
2d Sees. 404 (1954)..
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is that the same business generated both the income and the loss."3 ' How-
ever, absent such compelling facts a contrary decision could be possible.
B-10.11 Tax Benefit Rule - Liquidations
A recent letter ruling reflects the position of the IRS as to the time to
apply the tax benefit rule to corporate liquidations.5 0 According to this rul-
ing, the rule should be applied when there is such an interrelationship be-
tween the event which constitutes the loss or deduction and the event which
constitutes the recovery that they can be considered as parts of the same
transaction. The IRS also contends that the benefit rule overrides the non-
recognition provisions of section 336.351
However, recent decisions of the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit are
in conflict over this question. The Tax Court, in Bonaire v. Commissioner,32
applied the tax benefit rule to a corporation which had paid twelve months
of management fees in advance and then liquidated five months later. The
corporation used the cash basis method of accounting and, therefore, had
deducted the full twelve-month payment from its income. The Tax Court
first held that the advance payment for services for the remaining seven
months was not an ordinary and necessary expense because prepayment
was not required. The court then alternatively held that the tax benefit rule
would require inclusion of the seven months' fees in the corporation's in-
come. The court said the recovery was met because the expensed fees for
the additional seven months had a fair market value in the liquidation
distributions. This decision followed the position of the Sixth circuit.5S
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bliss Dairy v. United States, 5"'
however, declined to apply the tax benefit rule. That case involved a cor-
poration, a cash basis taxpayer, which paid for and deducted the cost of
cattle feed. At the beginning of its next fiscal year, the corporation was
liquidated but some of the cattle feed still remained. The district court
denied application of the tax benefit rule relying on the court of appeals
decision in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms.5 The Ninth Circuit agreed
that that case was controlling and said in both situations the liquidating
corporation received no economic benefit from the transfer of its assets to
its shareholders, and section 336 prevented the recognition of income to
the corporation.
Thus, the issue of when the tax benefit rule applies in corporate liqui-
849 640 F.2d at 1062.
850 Letter Ruling 8120139 (1981).
851 Bonaire Development Co. v. Commissioner, 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.67 at
425, 431 (1981).
8521d.
85 See Tennessee-Carolina Transp. Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), affd., 582
F.2d 378- (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440- U.S. 909 (1979). .
35' 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981). 8 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
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dations is subject to future debate. The IRS will probably seek other cases
to attempt to enforce its position.
B-10.12 Debt/Equity Regulations
The final regulations for section 38556 concerning the classification
of debt or equity (stock) of corporate interests have been postponed due
to negative reactions by the business community. The new effective date
is December 31, 1981 .' Criticisms and comments may be sent to the IRS
until this date.
B-11.O0 Subchapter S Corporations
B-1 1.01 Subdivision of Property
Subdivision of real property does not by itself prove that the property
was being held primarily for sale to customers, subjecting any gain on its
sale to ordinary income tax treatment. Rather, various factors must be
taken into consideration to determine whether the property has been held
primarily for sale to customers. These factors include the nature and purpose
of the acquisition of the property; the number and substantiality of the
sales; the extent of subdividing, developing, and advertising to increase
sales; and the use of a business office to increase sales. 8 '
In Buono v. Commissioner, taxpayers purchased 130 acres of real es-
tate intending to hold the property for 1 years and then resell it at a
profit. Taxpayers then formed a Subchapter S corporation and contracted
with engineers to draft a map showing the division of land into respective
lots, street layouts, and the proposed location of water and sewer lines. A
small portion of the real estate was condemned by the state to provide for
a new road; another fifteen acres were sold separately as a shopping center
lot; and the remaining acreage was sold to a single purchaser.
The Commissioner maintained that the taxpayers were in the business
of "packaging a product" due to the subdivision activities, and therefore,
the gain from the sale should be treated as ordinary income because the
property was held primarily for sale to customers. 5'
The Tax Court disagreed and held that several factors must be con-
sidered when determining whether or not the property was being held pri-
marily for resale to customers. The crucial factor is the taxpayers' intentions,
and here the court found that taxpayers at all times intended to sell the
unimproved property as a single tract.' Therefore, the gain from the sale
was a capital gain. The Commissioner has since acquiesced in the Tax
Court's decision in this case.""'
336 T.D. 7747, 1981-8 I.R.B. 15.
' 5 Announcement 81-88, 1981-20 LR.B. 12.
sBuono v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 187, 199 (1980).
359Id. at 198. 30id. at 201. 361 1981-5 I.R.B. 6.
Fall, 198 11
57
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 1981
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAW REVIEW
B- 11.02 Guaranteed Bank Loans
A net operating loss of a Subchapter S corporation may be taken as
a pro rata deduction from gross income of each shareholder. This deduction
is limited to the total of the shareholder's adjusted basis in the stock of the
corporation and the adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the corporation
to the shareholder.36 2 The Tax Court held in Williams v. Commissioner3 . that
when proceeds of a loan obtained by the corporation but guaranteed by the
shareholder are used to cancel debts of the corporation to the shareholder,
the shareholder's adjusted basis in the indebtedness is reduced, thereby reduc-
ing his maximum allowable net operating loss deduction.
In Williams, the shareholder of a Subchapter S corporation guaran-
teed a bank loan to the corporation. The bank then used part of the loan
proceeds to credit the shareholder's prior bank loans. The Commissioner
claimed that this repayment reduced the shareholder's adjusted basis in
the corporation. The shareholder contended that since the corporation did
not receive these loan proceeds, his basis should not be reduced. The Tax
Court agreed with the Commissioner, holding the corporation was a con-
structive recipient of the loan, and the basis of the shareholder was reduced
by the amount of the payment. Therefore, shareholders should be aware
that proceeds used to cancel Subchapter S corporate indebtedness need
not be received directly from the corporation before their adjusted basis
in the loans can be reduced.
B-12.00 Partnerships
B-12.01 Allocation of Partnership Losses
The problem before the Tax Court in Richardson v. Commissioner3 con-
cerned the allocation of losses among the partners of a limited partnership.
In the case, several new partners were admitted into partnerships on Decem-
ber 31, 1974. These new partners, by the terms of the partnership agree-
ment, were given 99 percent interest in the profits and losses for that year,
and a declining percentage in the following years. The partnerships used
the funds acquired from the new partners to pay previously accrued ex-
penses on December 31. The petitioners in Richardson sought to utilize an
interim closing-of-the-books method. The IRS contended that the only
reasonable methods of allocation were to permit a deduction for the percen-
tage of the tax year the new partners were members of the partnership
(1/365 in this case) or to allow the new partners a deduction only for
those expenses actually incurred and paid on December 31, 1974. The
Court noted that "any reasonable method of allocating profits and losses
for the period to and after the sale or exchange of interests is acceptable."3' 5
The Tax Court also recognized that the timing and deductibility of de-
362 I.R.C. § 1374. ea 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,054 at 158.
36476 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.45 at 275 (1981).
365 Id. at 283.
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ductions should be determined by the accounting method used by the part-
nership.36 The court held that since the partnership had used the cash
method of accounting and that the allocation of losses occurring on Decem-
ber 31, 1974, reflected economic reality and was reasonable, the petitioners
could utilize the interim closing of the books method for the allocation
of the losses of the partnerships." '
B-12.02 Small Partnerships - Filing Requirements
Section 6031 of the Code provides that all partnerships are to file a
tax return for each taxable year. The failure to complete such a return may
result in the imposition of the penalty prescribed by section 6698 unless
reasonable cause is shown for failure to file. Revenue Procedure 81-11,68
however, eliminates the need for partnership returns to be filed for certain
small partnerships. This IRS determination was based on the Congressional
intent evidenced by the Conference Committee Report concerning section
6698. The Report states that "[s]maller partnerships (those with 10 or
fewer partners) will not be subject to the penalty under this reasonable cause
test so long as each partner fully reports his share of income, deductions,
and credits of the partnership. ."..."I Even though this Conference Report
seems to make the intent of Congress in this particular matter very clear,
the instructions for the partnership return give no indication that smaller
partnerships could be exempt from filing. Instead, the 1980 instructions
speak to "every partnership" prior to giving notice of the possibility of
penalties.
Revenue Procedure 81-11 sets out which partnerships are required
to file. They include "partnerships with significant financial holdings, tier
partnerships, and partnerships where each partner's interests in the capital
and profits are not owned in the same proportion or where all items of in-
come, deductions, and credits are not allocated in proportion to such pro
rata interests."37 While providing an advantage to the small partnership
which have not historically filed a partnership return, Revenue Procedure
81-11 requires care in determining the status of a partnership.
After determining that a partnership status is one that is exempt from
filing, attention must then be given to whether each partner includes his
share of the income, deductions and credits on his individual return. This
Revenue Procedure cautions that although each case is viewed upon con-
sideration of all the facts and circumstances, a partnership may be found
to have not fully reported if an "error or omission results in a material
understatement of the net amount payable with respect to any income
tax." 37
3661d. at 284. 867 Id. 368 1981-13 I.R.B. 48.
369H.R. Rep. No. 95-1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221, (1978), reprinted In 1978-3 C.B.
(vol. 1) 521, 555.
370Rev. Proc. 81-11, 1981-13 I.R.B. 49 at § 3.02. sl Id. at § 3.04.
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B-12.03 Prepaid Oil/Gas Drilling Expenses
In Stradlings Building Materials v. Commissioner,7 2 the Tax Court
held that a deduction for prepaid intangible drilling expenses does not re-
quire full performance of the contract. In this case, the taxpayer corporation
was a limited partner in an oil and gas development company. The tax-
payer corporation made a capital contribution to the development com-
pany which then contracted for the drilling of six wells and paid in full the
costs of the drilling. The taxpayer, which used the accrual method of ac-
counting, then elected to deduct its share of the prepaid intangible drilling
expenses at the end of its fiscal year. However, in the following year, the
drilling contractor drilled only one of the wells and breached the contract
concerning the remaining five wells by refusing to drill them. The IRS
disallowed the taxpayer's deductions of prepaid expenses for those five wells,
contending that current deductions for intangible drilling costs are available
only for those costs which were actually incurred.
The Tax Court disagreed and stated that there are only four criteria...
to qualify for the deduction of intangible drilling costs: "(1) the taxpayer
must hold an operating or working interest in the property being developed;
(2) the costs in question must relate to the development of the property
in which the taxpayer has a working or operating interest; (3) the nature
of the expenditure must fall within the definitional guidelines provided by
section 1.612-4(a), Income Tax Regs., and (4) the payment or incurrence
of the costs must occur sufficiently early in the development stages so that
the taxpayer is exposed to the unknown risks of development."37 ' The court
noted that if the position of the IRS was adopted, then the petitioner, in
effect, would have been required to foresee the drilling company's breach
of the contract.375 The court viewed the situation from a June 30, 1973
perspective (which was the end of the petitioner's fiscal year) and held that
since the breach of contract could not have been foreseen, there was "no
logical basis on which to distinguish the deductibility of the prepaid costs
associated with the one well subsequently drilled from the prepaid costs
of the five wells subsequently not drilled." 7'
C. Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980,"
On October 19, 1980 the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 was
enacted, significantly changing the prior law regarding treatment of in-
stallment sales. The new Act defines an installment sale as a disposition of
real property or a disposition of personal property by a nondealer for which
at least one payment is to be deferred to a future tax year. 78 The advantages
37276 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.4 at 45 (1981).
878 Treas. Reg. 1.612-4(a) (1965).
174 76 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 76.4 at 47.
875 id. 57' Id. at 48.
377Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980). 8781d. at § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2247.
[Vol. 15:2
60
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/5
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981
of qualifying for installment treatment are the delay of recognition of some
gain until future payments are received and spreading of the gain on the
sale over more than one tax year. Although most of the basic concepts
of the previous law are continued, the new Act makes the specific changes
below. Generally, the Act is effective for transactions occurring after October
19, 1980, but some sections become effective on different dates.
C-1.00 Structural Changes
The new law simplifies the prior law by unifying the basic rules for
different types of transactions - under separate code sections. The basic
rules relating to nondealer transactions are contained in section 453 of the
Code. The basic rules relating to dealer transactions are now contained
a new section 453A, while the generally applicable installment disposition
rules are now contained in section 453B.
C-2.00 Initial Payment Limitation
Under prior law, payments received in the year of sale could not
exceed 30% of the selling price, otherwise installment sales treatment was
not available. The effect of the limitation has been to interfere with and
complicate normal business transactions. If the 30% limitation was ac-
cidentally exceeded even slightly, the entire gain would have to be recog-
nized in the year of the sale. The Act eliminates the 30% limitation and
requires only that one payment be deferred for sales of real property on
non-dealer personal property. Therefore, down payments of any amount
are allowable.
C-3.00 Two Payment Rule
Under prior law, the IRS required two or more payments of the purch-
ase price in two or more tax years. Therefore, a single payment could not be
considered to be payable in installments. This interpretation led to the in-
equitable result of a seller receiving a single installment payment, having
to pay taxes on the sale in the year of the sale and not receiving the pay-
ment until a subsequent year. The Act eliminates the requirements of the
two-payment, thus allowing the seller to defer recognition of his gain until
receipt of the payment. 19
C-4.00 Selling Price Limitation for Casual Sales of Personal Property
Under prior law, a casual sale of personal property did not qualify
for installment reporting unless the selling price was in excess of $1,000.
This requirement raised issues as to whether a single sale of several items
for more than $1,000 or a number of sales for under $1,000 qualified for
installment treatment. The Act eliminates this limitation on casual sales
of personal property. Thus there is no minimum selling price.8
319 S. Rep. No. 96-1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 4697.
08O ld.
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C-5.00 Election Out of Installment Reporting
Under prior law, installment reporting was available only to taxpayers
who affirmatively elected to treat the transaction as an installment sale. In
addition, inclusion of the entire gain in gross income was treated as a
binding election not to report on the installment method. Amended returns
were not allowed for taxpayers who forgot the election. The Act auto-
matically applies installment reporting to a qualified sale, that is a sale
falling within the statutory definitions, unless the taxpayer elects not to
treat the transaction as an installment sale."8' It should be noted that a
taxpayer may not want installment treatment if he has current losses to
offset the gain or if he expects his future income to increase dramatically,
making the gain subject to a higher tax bracket.
C-6.00 Related Party Sales
Under prior law, sales between related parties were permitted. Tax-
payers could defer income through intra-family transfers of appreciated
property. For example, the farmer/owner would sell some of his land to
his son at the fair market value. The farmer would only recognize gain as
the son made payments. The son could immediately sell the land to an
unrelated third party. Because the son's basis in the property is its fair mar-
ket value, the son would recognize little or no gain and the farmer could
continue to defer his recognition of the gain, because of the son's install-
ment payments. A similar device could be used with regard to the sale of
appreciated market securities.
The Act requires that when the related purchaser (the son, in the
above example) sells the appreciated property to the unrelated third-party
for cash on its equivalent the original seller (the farmer) must recognize
as an installment payment the amount from the sale to the extent at this
amount exceeds the previous installment payments. A related person for
purposes of this rule is one encompassed by section 318(a), generally
spouses, and family members, certain trusts and 80% owned corporations
or partnerships:
There are several exceptions to the new law. The original seller will
not have to recognize his gain immediately if:
1. The second sale is after the death of either the original seller or
the original buyer, or
2. the property is involuntarily converted, or
3. the second sale takes place more than two years after the date of
the original sale, unless the property is marketable securities or
has a substantial diminishing risk of ownership, or
4. the sale was of treasury stock, or
082 Id, at 4697-98.
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5. neither the original nor the second sale had as one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax.""
This new rule is effective retroactively to sales made after May 14, 1980,
and will undoubtedly create havoc for related parties who did not know
of the pending legislation.
C-7.00 Installment Obligations Distributed in a 12-Month Corporate
Liquidation
Under prior law, if a corporation had elected a 12 month plan of com-
plete liquidation, under section 337 and distributed installment obligations
to the shareholders, the shareholders must recognize gain to the extent of
the entire obligation. This, in effect, makes the shareholder liable for taxes
before he receives the installment payments.
Under the new law, the shareholder may report the gain from the
installment obligations received in the liquidation as installments."' 3 Hence,
the shareholder is taxed only for payments actually received. However, in-
stallment obligations received from the sale of inventory, other than by bulk
sale, do not qualify for installment treatment by the shareholder.
C-8.00 Cancellation of the Obligation
One strategy used under prior law was to cancel an obligation in
the form of a gift, which was not, by some case law, considered to be a dis-
position. In this manner, the purchaser would obtain a cost basis in the
property, and the seller would not have to recognize any gain. However,
the new law states that such gifts will be treated as dispositions, and, there-
fore, the seller will have to recognize his gain immediately, using the fair
market value of the obligation cancelled to calculate his gain. 8" However,
if the purchaser and seller are related parties, then the amount of the obli-
gation cancelled is to be used.
A similar strategy utilized was to bequeath the obligation to the
obligor. The new law neutralizes this strategy by requiring the seller's
estate to recognize any unreported gain from an installment sale if the
obligation is transferred to the obligor by bequest, devise, or inheritance.
Similar treatment is accorded to cancellations by the executor. Since this
law is not limited to specific bequests, care should be taken in drafting
a will in which the obligor is a residuary beneficiary. A tax to the estate
will result if the obligation is included in the residuary clause.
882 Pub. L No. 96-471, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2248, 2249 (amending I.R.C. § 453).
383 S. Rep. No. 96-1000. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4699-4700.
.84 S. Rep. No. 96-100, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEW: 4720-4721.
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C-9.00 Sales Subject to a Contingency
A contingent sale is where the selling price is not fixed and determin-
able. Under prior law, if the selling price was contingent the taxpayer was
required to recognize all gain in the year of sale, even though the install-
ment payments had not yet been received.
The Act permits installment sales treatment for sales involving a con-
tingent selling price. The Act prescribes that specific rules regarding quali-
fying transactions will be provided under treasury regulations.
According to temporary regulations recently released, 5' if a sale
has a maximum selling price, then this price must be used and all con-
tingencies must be assumed to be construed in favor of the seller when
calculating the gross profit ratio. If there is a fixed payout period, then the
basis of the seller is to be ratably charged over this period against any
payments received. If payments received during a year do not at least equal
that portion of the basis charged for the year, then no loss can be taken
for the year, and the unused basis is carried forward to the following year.
A loss cannot be recognized until the last year of the installment contract.
When there is no maximum selling price and no fixed payout period, the
seller's basis is to be spread over 15 years, with unrecovered basis from
any one year spread over the remainder of those 15 years. The income
forecast method may be used where the income from the contract is to
be spread unevenly throughout the life of the contract. When this method
is used, the seller uses a forecast of total payments to calculate his gross
profit ratio. Thus the cost recovery method treatment of a contingent sale,
where the basis is fully recovered before the recognition of profit, will be
more difficult to use under the new regulations. It can only be used in rare
and extraordinary circumstances, such as a situation where the fair market
value of the payments cannot be determined. If the seller attempts to use
this method and it is disallowed, his attempt may be deemed an election
not to use the installment method and he will have to recognize all of
the gain immediately.
D. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980"1 amends the Internal Revenue
Code by making several major changes in the tax treatment of bankrupt as
well as solvent taxpayers. The 1980 Act establishes rules for the tax
treatment of a debt discharge both within and outside of a bankruptcy
proceeding. Other noteworthy highlights of the new Act are the creation
of a separate taxable entity for income tax purposes arising from individual
bankruptcies, the treatment of creditor reorganizations, and new procedural
885Temp. Reg. 15A. 453-1(c) (1981). See also Temporary Regulations on Installment Sales
Focus on the Contingent Payment Sales, 54 J. TAX. 240, 241 (1981).
86 Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat, 3389 (1980).
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rules coordinating tax law with the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.87
Because there are various effective dates for different sections of the Act,
the taxpayer must pay careful attention to these dates in order to ascertain
the impact of the 1980 Act. In general the Act applies to transactions oc-
curring after December 31, 1980.
D-1.00 Discharge of Indebtedness
Under prior law, a solvent debtor outside bankruptcy could elect
to reduce the basis of either depreciable or nondepreciable assets to avoid
inclusion of the discharged debt in gross income. The new rules under the
1980 Act provide that the election is limited to depreciable assets. This
election applies to individuals or corporations with depreciable property,
whose basis has been reduced, and is subject to the recapture provisions
of the Code. An exception arises in the case of purchase money debts.
If the seller reduces the debt of a solvent buyer, which arose out of a purch-
ase money transaction, then the purchaser need not recognize any debt
discharge income. This rule does not apply when the seller transfers the
debt to a third party, nor does it apply to reductions for reasons other
than direct agreements between buyer and seller.38
D-2.00 Debtors in Bankruptcy and Insolvent Debtors Outside Bankruptcy
Prior to the 1980 Act, when a taxpayer was insolvent both before and
after the debt discharge he realized no income. If the taxpayer was solvent
after the discharge he realized income to the extent of his solvency, but he
could elect to exclude this amount from gross income by reducing the
basis in his assets.
Under the 1980 Act, insolvent debtors outside bankruptcy and debtors
in bankruptcy do not realize income from the discharge of indebtedness
but must reduce tax attributes unless the debtor elects to reduce his basis
in depreciable property. Tax attributes must be reduced in the following
order: (1) a dollar for dollar reduction of net operating losses and carry-
overs; (2) a fifty percent reduction of the new jobs credit, the WIN credit,
of carryovers in the investment tax credit (excepting the TRASOP credit),
and the credit for alcohol used as fuel; (3) a dollar for dollar reduction
of capital losses and carryovers; (4) if any debt discharge amount re-
mains, then the debtor's basis in assets will be reduced (however, the
debtor's basis in assets will not be reduced below the amount of his remain-
ing undischarged liabilities); (5) a fifty percent reduction of foreign tax
credit carryovers.88 Gains realized upon disposition of the reduced basis
assets are subject to recapture.
887 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
388 S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEws 7030.
388 Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3390.
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D-3.00 General Rules Applicable to Solvent, Insolvent, and Bankrupt
Debtors
Under prior law, a party related to a debtor could acquire his debt
at a discount and the debtor would not realize any debt discharge income.
Under the 1980 Act, the IRS may treat the acquisition of a debt by a person
related to the debtor from an unrelated party as an acquisition by the debtor
in order to determine the debtor's income."' Debt discharge income results
when the debt is acquired at a discount."9'
A related party, for purposes of this rule, is:
(1) a member of a controlled group of corporations (as defined for
purposes of Code section 414(b)) of which group the debtor is a
member; (2) a trade or business treated as under common control with
respect to the debtor (within the meaning of Code sections 414(b)
or 414(c)); (3) either a partner in a partnership treated as controlled
by the debtor or a controlled partnership with respect to the debtor
(within the meaning of Code section 707(b)(1): or (4) a member
of the debtor's family or other person bearing a relationship to the debtor
specified in Code section 267 (b) .392
If a corporation issues its own stock to cancel a debt, no income
arises from the discharge of indebtedness and no tax attribute reduction
is required. This is so even if the value of the stock is less than the amount
of the debt, unless the stock issued was a nominal amount.
Under prior law, the discharge of a partnership debt was treated as
income to the partnership. Under the 1980 Act, the rules of exclusion from
gross income and reduction of tax attributes will be applied at the partner
level. Therefore, discharge of partnership indebtedness will not be treated
as income to the partnership, but to the partners.
Other significant changes applicable to any debtor include the follow-
ing- (1) For corporations, the income exclusion rule does not apply to
acquisitions by the corporation of its own indebtedness from its stockhold-
ers; this was treated as contributions to capital under prior law. (2) The
cancellation liability which would be deductible when paid is not treated
as income when forgiven. (3) As a clarification to the tax benefit rule,
the 1980 Act provides that if a deduction in a prior year increased a carry-
over that has not expired, then that deduction is deemed to have produced
a tax benefit to the taxpayer. Therefore, under the tax benefit rule, the
discharge of a prior obligation would be debt discharge income.
D-4.00 Individual Bankruptcy Estate
Under prior law, there was no determination in the Code as to whether
890 S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD,
NEws 7034.
392 Id.
392 Pub. L No. 96-589, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 3397.
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an individual and his bankruptcy estate were separate entities. The IRS
maintained that they were separate entities, but some courts held otherwise.
The new law specifically states that an individual debtor's estate will
be treated as a separate taxable entity in Chapter 7 (relating to liquidations)
and Chapter 11 (relating to reorganizations) bankruptcies. However, no
separate entity results when an individual debtor commences a Chapter 13
bankruptcy (relating to adjustment of debts of an individual with regular
income.)"' Furthermore, corporations and partnerships in bankruptcy are
not treated as separate entities.
D-5.00 Rules for Corporations
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 creates a new type of tax-free re-
organization entitled a "G" reorganization. A "G" reorganization is a trans-
fer by a corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation pur-
suant to a court approved plan of reorganization. 39 4 The acquiring corpo-
ration's stock or securities must be distributed in a transaction that qualifies
under section 354, 355, or 356. The test is whether substantially all of the
assets are transferred to the acquiring corporation. In addition, the judicially
imposed "continuity of interest" requirement must be met in order for a
"G" reorganization to qualify for tax free treatment.
The new "G" reorganization provision does not require compliance
with state merger laws (as in type "A" reorganizations), does not require
that the target corporation receive solely stock from the acquiring corpo-
ration in exchange for its assets (as in type "C"), and does not require that
the former stockholders of the target corporation control the corporation.
The Act also extends "G" reorganization provisions to triangular reorganiza-
tions and reverse mergers.
The new Act permits corporations in bankruptcy or insolvency pro-
ceedings to liquidate and transfer assets directly to creditors or sharehold-
ers. 9 This liquidation must be completed before the termination of the case,
rather than the regular twelve month period under section 337 of the Code.
The nonrecognition rule of section 351 does not apply where an un-
secured debt or a claim for accrued but unpaid interest is transferred for
stock or securities to a controlled corporation. 9"
The new Act also provides that an individual's bankruptcy estate may
be a shareholder in a Subchapter S corporation without causing termination
of the Subchapter S election. 9
893 S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEws 7039.
394 S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7049-7050.
-9 Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 5(c), 94 Stat. 3405-06 (amending I.R.C. § 337.
3"id. at § 5(e)(1) (amending I.R.C. § 351).
a19 Id. at § 5(d) (amending I.R.C. § 1371).
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In the area of earnings and profits, the new law provides that the dis-
charge of indebtedness of a corporate debtor increases the earnings and pro-
fits of the debtor corporation to the extent of the reduction of tax attributes. 8 '
However, reductions in the basis of depreciable property will not increase
earnings and profits immediately, but will be reflected in lower depreciation
expenses taken over the life of the assets.
Finally, under the 1980 Act a corporation in bankruptcy will not be
deemed to be a personal holding company if the avoidance of the personal
holding company tax was not a major purpose for commencing or continuing
the bankruptcy proceeding.'"
D-6.00 Jurisdiction and Procedure in Bankruptcy
The 1980 Act clarified some of the jurisdictional and procedural con-
flicts between the U.S. Tax Court and the bankruptcy courts. Generally,
the bankruptcy court is given the authority to determine whether the issue
of the debtor's tax liability should be decided in the bankruptcy court or
in the U.S. Tax Court. Other procedures clarified by the new Act include
the automatic stay on collection or assessment of certain tax claims against
the debtor, and the automatic stay on institution or continuation by the
debtor of deficiency litigation in the U.S. Tax Court. '
E. Miscellaneous Tax Laws of 1980
The nine separate tax bills summarized in this section are popularly
referred to as the Miscellaneous Tax Act of 1980.
E-1.00 Entertainment Facility Expense
The general rule, under section 274(a), allows a deduction for enter-
tainment facility expenses only if activities of the facility were directly
related to the taxpayer's active trade or business, or the facility was used
for business discussion. Under the new provision,' expenses of the facility
are deductible if the recipient of the entertainment must include the costs
for his entertainment in his gross income. For example, if a salesman re-
ceives a bonus or prize from his employer of a week at the company's
lodge which is includable in the salesman's gross income, then the costs of
the facility for that week are deductible by the employer.
E-2.00 Withholding - Sick Pay
Employees may now' elect to have tax withheld from payments of
sick pay made to him by a third party who is not his employer (e.g. an
8 98 Id. at § 5(f) (amending I.R.C. § 312).
899 Id. at § 5(a) (amending I.R.C. § 542).
6
0 0 S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 7060-7061.
401 Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 108(a), 94 Stat. 3521, 3524
(amending I.R.C. § 274).
402 Pub. L. No. 96-601, § 4, 94 Stat. 3496 (amending I.R.C. § 3402).
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insurance company). Previously, no tax was required to be withheld by
the employer which created the possibility of a penalty tax being imposed
upon the employee.
E-3.00 Amortization - Business Startup Costs
Under section 195, start-up costs incurred before the commencement
of business were nondeductible because they were not incurred in carrying
on a trade or business. These costs were to be capitalized and not depreci-
ated or amortized, but could be included in determining gain or loss upon
sale or termination of the business. The new amendment to section 19503
allows the business an election to capitalize start-up costs incurred after
July 29, 1980, and to amortize them over a period of not less than sixty
months.
E-4.00 Professional Corporation - Pension
A professional corporation had been able to avoid providing benefits
to certain employees by the formation of a partnership with another pro-
fessional corporation, each being a fifty percent partner. Unless an employer
retained at least a 51 % interest in the business, the Code did not require
him to provide pension benefits. By the 1980 amendments, ' for purposes
of the minimum participation standards, the test for control has been re-
duced to a ten percent interest.
E-5.00 Foreign Convention Expenses
Section 274, concerning deductions for expenses incurred in attending
foreign conventions has been liberalized.0 5 The requirements under the
new law are in some instances more strict than those under prior law, but
once qualified, the taxpayer may have larger deductions available to him.
The maximum deduction allowed is subject only to the normal business
expense deduction rules. The number of conventions qualifying as a de-
duction is no longer limited to two. Transportation expenses are no longer
limited to the coach or economy fare rate and there is no limit on time
spent for business purposes. Subsistence expenses are no longer limited to
the per diem rate for civil servants. The only limitation is that expenses
are not extravagant or lavish. In addition, reporting requirements are lib-
eralized to be the same as domestic business travel expenses.
Previously, a taxpayer had to show that the primary purpose for at-
tending the convention was business. The new law substitutes a "reasonable-
ness" test based on:
(1) the purpose and activities taking place at the meeting,
(2) the purpose and activities of the sponsoring organization or group,
403 Pub. L No. 96-605, § 102, 94 Stat. 3522 (amending I.R.C. § 195).
''Id. at § 201, 94 Stat. 3526 (amending I.R.C. § 414(m)).
405 Pub. L. No. 96-608, § 4, 94 Stat. 3552 (amending I.R.C. § 274(h).
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(3) the residences of the active members of the organization and where
other similar meetings have been held,
(4) other relevant factors presented by the taxpayer.,"
A convention will not be considered "foreign" under the new amend-
ment unless it is held outside the "United States, its possessions, and the
Trust territory of the Pacific Islands, and Canada and Mexico."" ° How-
ever, no deductions will be allowed for conventions which occur on a cruise
ship.
Taxpayers are still, however, subject to the allocation rules for foreign
business travel. Taxpayers must be outside of the country for more than
one week and must allocate expenses for the purpose of the deduction if
less than 75 % of the taxpayer's time is spent in business related activities.
E-6.00 Supplemental Unemployment Compensation - Repayments
If a laid-off taxpayer had collected supplemental unemployment com-
pensation benefits (SUB) and then subsequently received trade readjustment
assistance, in many instances he was required to repay the SUB benefits.
The taxpayer had to repay at least $3,000 to qualify for tax relief under
the claim of right doctrine as set forth in section 1341. If the repayment
was less than $3,000, the taxpayer received no tax relief unless deductions
were itemized. Amended"0 8 section 62(16) now allows a deduction from
gross income for repayments of SUB benefits required by receipt of subsequent
trade readjustment assistance.
E-7.00 Oil/Gas Percentage Depletion - Allocation
Under section 55, the transfer of proven oil and gas properties after
1974 by an individual generally resulted in a disallowance of the percentage
depletion. However, percentage depletion could be used if the transferee
and transferor were required to allocate one depletable quantity. As
amended, ' section 55 allows an individual to elect to transfer his property
to a controlled corporation and to remain eligible for the percentage de-
pletion deduction if the conditions of the section are met.
E-8.00 Pension Plans - Rollovers
Prior to the 1980 amendment " ' to section 402 (a), if an employee was
covered by both a qualified money purchase pension plan and a qualified de-
fined benefit plan, the employee could not roll over a distribution from the
money purchase plan unless the defined benefit plan was also fully dis-
tributed.
logId.-4071d."-
,
08 Id. at § 3 (amending I.R.C. § 62).
4o9 Pub. L. No. 96-603, § 3, 94 Stat. 3513 (amending I.R.C. § 613A).
4 0oPub. L. No. 96-608, § 2, 94 Stat. 3551 (amending I.R.C. § 402(a)).
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Under amended section 402(a), the employee may roll over the money
purchase plan distribution into an individual retirement account or other
qualified plan without a full distribution from the deferred benefit plan,
and have the pension distribution be tax-free.
E-9.00 Alternate Minimum Tax - Tax Credit Offsets
Prior to the 1980 amendment, '11 the foreign tax credit was the only
credit that could offset the alternate minimum tax credit. Under amended
section 55, a credit which is nonrefundable (i.e. if the credit is more than
the tax liability) can be used to offset the alternate minimum tax which is
attributable to the active conduct of a trade or business. Alternate minimum
taxes attributable to capital gains or adjusted itemized deductions, however,
may not be offset by the credit.
E-10.00 Pension - Debt Financed Real Estate
Income from debt-financed property owned by an employee trust for
a qualified pension plan has been subject to income tax. The new law '12
exempts income arising from real estate financed by debt from income tax
to the qualified trust if the ERISA requirements are met.
E-11.00 Pension - Cafeteria Plan
A cafeteria plan provides that employees may choose among two or
more benefits, which may be non-taxable benefits, or taxable benefits such
as cash or property. Previously, a cafeteria plan could not provide for de-
ferred compensation.
Under amended 1 ' section 125, however, if a profit-sharing or stock
bonus plan includes a qualified cash or deferred arrangement, the employee
may elect to have the employer contribute such amounts as a non-taxable
benefit.
F. Reasonable Compensation - Update
F-1.00 Overview
Section 162(a) of the Code deals with itemized deductions allowed
in connection with a trade or business. Subsection (1) refers specifically
to deductions allowed for "reasonable" compensation for services actually
rendered by an employee to that trade or business. An entire series of cases
have been decided by the courts in an attempt to determine exactly what
compensation is reasonable. Decisions may be bound together by overlapping
groups of factors " that courts consider important in determining reasonable-
-" Pub. L. No. 96-608, § 4, 94 Stat. 3515 (amending I.R.C. § 55).
412 Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 110, 94 Stat. 3525 (amending I.R.C. § 514).
41 81d. § 226, 94 Stat. 3529 (amending I.R.C. § 125).
4 14In Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949) the court ex-
plained:
Although every case of this kind must stand upon its own facts and circumstances,
it is well settled that several basic factors should be considered by the Court in reaching
its decision in any particular case. Such factors include the employee's qualifications;
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ness, although there is no hierarchy as to which factors control. Each case
is determined individually by viewing specific facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the employer's business and economic status, as well as the im-
portance of the employee's contribution to the trade or business.
Although the compensation set by a corporation's board of directors
is ordinarily presumed to be reasonable, '15 many problems arise when the
corporation is closely held. Since, in this type of corporation, the employees
are normally both members of the board of directors and shareholders, ex-
treme care is taken by courts in ascertaining whether the amounts received
by the employee are indeed compensation for services rendered and not divi-
dends or a share of profits disguised as a salary or bonus. Prior to the passage
of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 this determination had a dual
impact. In addition to affecting the deductibility by the corporation of the
payments made to the employee, the amount found to be actual compensa-
tion could also affect the individual's income tax rate. Under the old law,
dividends paid to the employee could be subjected to a maximum marginal
tax rate of up to seventy percent whereas the tax rate was limited to fifty
percent for personal service income or compensation."' Under the new law
all income is limited to a fifty percent tax rate.41 ' The determination of
reasonable compensation is still important, however, in determining the,
allowable deductions for a corporation. Even though the tax rate for the
two types of income, personal service income and dividends, is now uni-
form, the courts are sure to distinguish between the two in order to de-
termine the reasonableness of compensation received by an employee.
The cases discussed in this section deal with the treatment of the
question of "reasonable compensation" by past courts and offer guidance
for the future.
F-2.00 Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Commissioner
In Home Interiors and Gifts, Inc. v. Commissioner"8 the Tax Court
had to decide whether compensation consisting primarily of commissions
and bonuses was reasonable. The major factors considered by the court
in making its determination were the amount of compensation received
by the employees as compared to similarly situated employees in comparable
corporations, how the commissions received by these key employees corn-
the nature, extent and scope of the employee's work; the size and complexities of the
business; a comparison of salaries paid with gross income and the net income; the pre-
vailing general economic conditions; comparison of salaries with distributions to stock-
holders; the prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable
concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and in the case of small
corporations with a limited number of officers the amount of compensation paid to
the particular employee in previous years.
415 Id. at 119.
46 I.R.C. § 1348 (1976).
,17 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, § 101(c), 95 Stat. 172.
418 73 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. V 73.92 at 629 (1980).
[Vol. 15:2
72
Akron Law Review, Vol. 15 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol15/iss1/5
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1981
pared to those received by other employees of the corporation, and how vital
the services of these employees had been to the success of the corporation.'19
The corporation in question was founded by Mrs. Crowley, who was
also president and national sales manager. ' She owned approximately 27%
of the corporation in question. Her son, Mr. Carter, was executive vice
president of the company and owned 19% of its stock.' 2' The third employee
whose compensation was being reviewed was Mr. Homer,"2 who became
vice president for administration and owned less than one percent of the
stock of Home Interiors.
The court looked to the particular circumstances surrounding the
operation of the company and determined that the compensation received
by these three employees was reasonable within the meaning of section
162(a) (1).2 The court specifically noted the close working relationship
Mrs. Crowley had with her force of managers and employees in both training
them and encouraging their high volume of sales. This was important since
the company sold home beautifying merchandise on a "hostess plan"42' where-
by the greater the amounts sold by the lower level employees, the greater the
corporate earnings. In addition, Mrs. Crowley worked long hours and pos-
sessed what the court termed "rare talent" not easily replaceable. '25 Mr.
Carter was also found to have made great contributions to the corporation
through his many and varied services."' As to Mr. Horner, the court noted
that since his compensation was determined in an arms length transaction
it was unlikely that the company would pay him more than the value of
his services."2 7 As a factor supporting the taxpayers' claims, the court also
noted that the compensation of these three employees increased at a rate
comparable to the compensation of other area managers of the company
during the time period in question.
Since the compensation of the employees was prearranged and the
company was still paying substantial dividends on its stock, the court de-
termined that it was reasonable to continue to follow the compensation
1old. at 639-41.
420 Id. at 630. See "Employee X" on Reasonable Compensation Table infra, F-9.00.
421 Id. at 633. See "Employee Y" on Reasonable Compensation Table infra, F-9.00.
422 Id. at 634. See "Employee Z" on Reasonable Compensation Table infra, F-9.00.
423 Id. at 634.
424 Under this plan products are sold by the sales representation to purchasers in the home
of a cooperating hostess. The sales representative is an independent contractor who earns
a profit when he sells at retail the products he bought from Home Interiors at wholesale.
Id. at 630.
425 Id. at 639.
428. Id.
427 Id. at 639-40. Mr. Horner was not on the board of -directors.
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contract. 2 ' The court noted that this was true especially in light of the
fact that although the compensation of these employees was increasing,
the amount received was actually a lesser percentage of the company's
earned profits. 2 '
Although the compensation of Mrs. Crowley, Mr. Carter, and Mr.
Homer exceeded that of similarly situated employees in corporations of
comparable size and economic status, the court held that the higher amounts
were within the realm of reasonable compensation since these three in-
dividuals were so instrumental in the growth and success of the corpor-
ation." '
F-3.00 Old Colony Insurance Service, Inc. v. Commissioner
The petitioner in Old Colony Insurance Service, Inc. v. Commissioner,431
was a Kentucky insurance company whose primary business involved sell-
ing mortality insurance on race horses. The two employees each received
a salary of $64,223 as well as a commission at the end of the year. "32 Each
of the employees owned fifty percent of the corporation's stock and was,
in addition, an officer and director of the corporation. The Commissioner
asserted that the reasonable salary deductions to the corporation for each
employee were actually $34,223. The Commissioner noted that the addi-
tional $30,000 claimed by the Corporation taxpayer was not deductible
salary expense under section 162(a)(1) of the Code. Instead, the Com-
missioner contended that these disbursements were either a distribution of
profits disguised as compensation or unreasonable compensation.
Several factors were urged as controlling by the IRS. First, because
of the role of the employees in the corporation, there was no arms-length
bargaining in the determination of compensation. Second, the corporation
had failed to pay dividends. Third, there was a direct correlation between
the ownership of stock by the employees and the amount of compensation
each received. Finally, there was an increase in salary received by the em-
ployees at the end of the corporation's taxable year, which was a time when
the year's profits could be determined with some certainty.
4 28 The court referred to Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b) (2) (1960) citing the following portion as
relevant:
Generally speaking, if contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a free bargain . . .
before the services are rendered, not influenced by any consideration on the part of
the employer other than that of securing on fair and advantageous terms the services
of the individual, it should be allowed as a deduction even though in the actual working
out of the contract it may prove to be greater than the amount which would ordinarily
be paid.
Id. at 640.
29Id. at 641.
430 Id.
431 1981 Tax Ct. Mem. (P-H) Dec. 81,177 at 566.
432 Id. at 569. One employee received a commission of $181,966, while the other received
a commission of $23,220. The IRS did not contest the reasonableness of these amounts.
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Although the Tax Court agreed that the failure to pay dividends is often
an indication of possible compensation which actually represents a share
of profit or dividends, it refused to give this factor overriding consideration.
Strict scrutiny was used since the employees, in their roles as corporate
directors, had determined their own salaries. Despite both of these factors,
however, the Tax Court held in favor of the corporate taxpayer and refused
to substitute its own judgment for that of the board of directors.
The court looked to the past employee payment history of the corpora-
tion and noted that for several years before the one in question, the em-
ployees involved had often been underpaid. It determined that any excess
payment in 1974 was merely to make up for past services rendered. In
addition, the court looked to the amount of work and time contributed by
the employees to the corporate business. The court found that the services
rendered by the two employees were indeed unique and necessary for the
carrying on of the business in question. ' These two factors led the Tax
Court to find that the deductions for compensation were properly claimed
by the corporate taxpayer.
F-4.00 Schiff v. Commissioner
Another case which required the court to determine the reasonableness
of compensation in a closely held corporation was that of Schiff v. Com-
missioner.3 ' This was necessary in order to set the maximum tax rate on
the income in question and to ascertain its deductibility by the corporation.
The reasonableness of the compensation in this case was questioned
since the two employees were the sole stockholders of the insurance cor-
poration. Along with other employees of the corporation, the shareholders
received a commission based on premiums for insurance policies sold. In
addition, the taxpayers awarded themselves bonuses which were based on
an estimate of the corporation's profits, as well as its projected cash needs
rather than on a predetermined formula. One employee-shareholder re-
ceived $80,199 in commissions and a bonus of $146,199 while the other
received $86,852 in commissions and a bonus of $70,000.""
While the IRS contended that the amounts paid to the taxpayers as
compensation for personal service were excessive, the Tax Court disagreed
and held that the total amounts constituted reasonable compensation within
the meaning of section 162 and were therefore subject to the fifty percent
maximum tax rate of section 1348, and were deductible by the corporation.
The factors cited as favoring a finding of reasonableness were: (1) the two
employees in question produced more business than the others; (2) they
also produced less losses; (3) they were prompt in transmitting premiums
433.1d. at 570.
',641980 Tax Ct. Mem. (P-H) Dec. § 80,578 at 2455.
4351d. at 2460.
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to their chartered insurance company which increased the company's
contingent commissions income; (4) the taxpayers supervised the train-
ing, sales and credit activities of the other employees; (5) the taxpayers
negotiated with other insurance companies on behalf of their company; and
(6) the amounts of commissions and bonuses were not proportionate to
their shareholdings in the corporation.4 1 6
Even though the entire amount in question was determined to be
reasonable compensation, the court noted that the following facts might
indicate the contrary: (1) the bonuses awarded were not determined by
a formula or previous agreement; (2) estimates of profit and needed cash
flow were made before the award of bonuses; (3) bonus payments were
not subjected to withholding taxes; and (4) the amounts of corporation's
dividends and retained income were small. 37
While the taxpayers prevailed in this instance, the court referred to
their decision as "a close call." 38 This seems to be a warning that the practice
of awarding bonuses without some pre-arranged plan, and a practice of
paying few dividends while returning only small amounts of capital in the
corporation, will not be considered favorably in determining the reason-
ableness of compensation.
F-5.00 Foos v. Commissioner
In the case of Foos v. Commissioner," 9 the court looked to the rea-
sonableness of the compensation paid to two corporate employees"0 to
determine their taxable rate of income on their receipts from the corpora-
tion. Section 1348 of the Code makes the character of the income received
by an individual important in determining the rate at which it will be taxed.
Any reasonable compensation received in return for services rendered to
the corporation would be earned income and therefore limited to a tax
rate of fifty percent. On the other hand, if the income in question was de-
termined to be unreasonable compensation for services, it would be a share
of profits or dividends disguised as salary or a bonus and would not be
limited to a fifty percent tax rate. The tax imposed on unearned income
may be taxed at a rate of up to seventy percent."'
The taxpayer, in an attempt to remain within section 1348, claimed
that the corporation in question was a professional service corporation and
436 Id. at 2461-62.
437 Id. at 2462.
438 Id.
431 1981 Tax Ct. Mem. (P-H) Dec. 81,061 at 177.
440 Each of the employees had claimed compensation of $1,128,700 for 1974, $3,180,000
for 1975. In 1976, one employee claimed compensation of $1,484,000 while the other claimed
$1,388,000. 1981 Tax Ct. Mem. (P-H) Dec. 1 81,061 at 186.
441 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 has lowered the maximum income tax rate to 50
percent. However, the issue remains viable because dividends are not deductible by the
corporation, while salary expenses are deductible.
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that all income received was a result of professional services rendered and,
therefore, constituted earned income. The taxpayers were involved in a
coal brokerage business. They bought coal from mines and sold it to users.
The taxpayer advanced several reasons in support of the corporation's status
as a professional service corporation ' 2 which they contended should bring
all resulting income within the parameters of section 1348. The court re-
jected such a classification noting that income from professional service cor-
porations is derived solely from fees for professional services. In this in-
stance, the funds generated by the business were not paid for the services
themselves, nor were they commissions. The court found that they were
simply profits on sales and found it necessary to turn to other factors to
determine the reasonableness and nature of the compensation in question.
The court considered several factors" 3 in determining whether the
compensation was reasonable. As a result, it determined that although it
is proper for a corporation to pay its employees on a percentage basis where
profits are largely a result of employee efforts, they are still subject to a
reasonable and necessary standard under section 162(a) (1). In this case
although the court agreed that ninety percent of the Company's profits
paid as compensation was too much, the taxpayer had sustained the burden
of showing that the Commissioner's estimates were too low. As a result,
the presumption that the Commissioner's figures were correct was no longer
in effect. In determining the reasonable amount of compensation, the Tax
Court considered the facts of the case, placing great emphasis on the fact
that the employees devoted extremely long hours to the company. The court
noted that the company employed few employees, yet were able to generate
a substantial volume of business.' The court allowed the follow-
ing amounts as reasonable compensation for the years in question. Each
employee was allowed $807,930 in 1974 and $1,606,210 in 1975. In
1976, one employee was credited with $1,044,930 while the other was
permitted $948,930.145
F-6.00 Cromer v. Commissioner
The failure to pay dividends coupled with the payment of an extremely
high percentage of corporate income as compensation served as a basis for
a determination that reasonable compensation had not been paid in the case
of Cromer v. Commissioner.4" In making this determination the Court
looked, again, to the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
Cromer was the president and sole shareholder of Capitol Air Service,
Inc. In addition to his duties as president, he acted as a pilot, charter pilot,
dispatcher and flight instructor. Shortly after becoming president of Capitol,
"44 1981 Tax Ct. Mem. (P-H) Dec. 81,061 at 194.
443 Id.
4 4 Id. at 198. -5 Id. at 192.
448 1980 Tax Ct. Mem. (P-H) Dec. 80,263 at 1155,
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Cromer entered into an employment contract with Capitol. The contract
established that Cromer would receive $103,800 annually as well as a
bonus which was to be determined according to a specified formula. Al-
though prearranged formulas are often an accepted means of assuring the
reasonableness of compensation at a future date, the court gave little em-
phasis to the existence of such a formula, since there was an absence of
arms-length bargaining. The court noted that the formula resulted in the
payment to Cromer 99.7 to 99.9% of Capitol's income. " This, coupled
with the fact that no dividends were paid by the corporation, led the court
to the conclusion that some of the funds claimed as compensation for
services were, in fact, dividends. '
F-7.00 Giles Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner
In Giles Industries, Inc. v. United States.4 9 the Court of Claims used
the Consumer Price Index as an indicator of the reasonableness of compen-
sation. In a previous case between the parties, ' ° reasonable compensation
for the three officers of the corporation was determined by the court for
the years 1964-1967. The issue before the court in Giles II was the deter-
mination of reasonable compensation in the years subsequent to 1967.
In the years following 1967, the amounts claimed as deductions for
compensation were steadily increased. The court used the Consumer Price
Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to adjust the 1967 compensation
to reflect inflationary changes in the acceptable levels for the years in
question. In addition, the salary of each employee was adjusted to reflect
his increase or decrease of duties. In reaching its decision, the court also
considered the average officer compensation paid by other industries."'"
F-8.00 Shotmeyer v. Commissioner
In Shotmeyer v. Commissioner, '52 compensation paid to the chief
executive officer and sole shareholder of Shotmeyer Petroleum was chal-
lenged on two bases. First, the IRS claimed that Mr. Shotmeyer spent the
majority of his time at his Florida residence and was semi-retired and
therefore was not entitled to as much compensation as he had received in
the past. Second, the Commissioner challenged the legitimacy since a divi-
dend had never been paid by Shotmeyer Petroleum. Despite these cir-
cumstances, the court determined that the compensation paid by the cor-
poration to Mr. Shotmeyer was reasonable. " "
"7Id. at 1159.
448 Id.
449 650 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
450 Giles Indus. v. United States, 496 F.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
45'650 F.2d at 278.
452 1980 Tax Ct. Mem, (P-H) Dec. 80,238 at 1044.
,458 Id, At 1046.
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In rejecting the IRS' first contention, the court noted that while Mr.
Shotmeyer did, indeed, spend much of his time in Florida during the years
in question, legitimate business reasons accounted for his continued presence
there. First, Mr. Shotmeyer investigated "the potential for expansion of
Shotmeyer Petroleum's business into the Florida market." 5 ' as well as
the possibility of acquiring several Florida businesses. In addition, Shotmeyer
maintained daily contact with the New Jersey home office. When in New
Jersey, Shotmeyer worked long hours and Saturdays at the home office.
This served to refute any argument that Shotmeyer was easing his way into
retirement. To the contrary, the court looked to his many contributions and
dedication to the corporation as support for the reasonableness of the com-
pensation he received. The court noted:
Taking the highest salary paid to either of the two sons and adding
thereto the additional value to the corporation of Mr. Shotmeyer's ex-
perience, business acumen, contacts, securing corporate debts, high
esteem among his peers in the industry, and his foregoing of either
a pension or profit sharing plan and life insurance and his under-
compensation in previous years, we find that Shotmeyer Petroleum prop-
erly characterized its payments to Mr. Shotmeyer as Compensation. 55
The court found that the failure of Shotmeyer Petroleum to pay divi-
dends was not fatal to its claim that Mr. Shotmeyer received reasonable
compensation. In considering the dividend issue the court states:
If its stock were owned by an unrelated third party who had ad-
vanced capital, there would naturally come a time when that party
would become restless over Shotmeyer Petroleum's failure to pay a
return on his investment. We are not prepared to say that it had
reached that point with respect to its taxable years here in issue, al-
though we certainly do not predict what our reaction would be to a
similar failure to pay dividends in the future."5'
This leaves no doubt as to the continued importance of the payment
of corporate dividends in the determination of reasonable compensation
in a closely held corporation. However, it is not yet the prime consideration.
454 Id.
455 Id. at 1049.
Am Id.
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F-9.00 Reasonable Compensation Table
STOCK OWNERSHIP OF
BUSINESS OF TAXPAYER EMPLOYEE CLAIMED COMPENSATION
Home decorators and accessories X owned 27% Emp. X ranged from 566,364 in
sales Y owned 19% 1971 to 1,137,023 in 1975
Home Interiors and Gifts, Inc. ZEmp. Y ranged from 456,841 in
73 Tax Ct. Rep. (P-H) Dec. 73.92 Employer paid dividends: E9p. t ranged fo 4 5(1980) '71 - 63,549 1971 to 1,135,749 in 1975
'72 -1,800,274 Emp.Z ranged from 71,232 in
Tax Years: 71-75 '73 313,274 1971 t 277,95 in 75
'74 - 470,495 1971 to 277,954 in 1975
75 - 544,895
Insurance Brokerage Each of two employees owned 50% Emp. A 64,223(s) 181,966 (com.)
Old Colony Insurance Service, Inc. Emp. B 64,223(s) 23,220 (com.)
1980 T.C.M. (P-H) t 81,177 No dividends paid by employer (s) - salary (cor.) commission
Tax Year: 74
Insurance Each of two employees owned 50% Emp. A
'73 - 146,199John J. Schiff Employer paid dividends: '74 - 156,852
1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,578 '73 - 7,145 Emp. B
'74 - 910 '73 -129,317
Tax Years: 73-74 '74 - 141,266
Coal Brokerage Each of two employees owned 50% Emp. A
'74 - 1,128,700
Helen L Foes Employer paid dividends: '75 - 3,180,000
1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,061 '74 - 196,000 '76 - 1,484,000
'75 - 143,574 Em;. B
Tax Years: 74-76 '76 - 785,585 '74 - 1,128,700
'75 - 3,180,000
'76 - 1,388,000
Commuter air carrier Employee is sole shareholder '73 - 329,300
'74 - 442,900
Gary N. Cromer Employee paid dividends: '75 - 411,999
1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,263 '70 - 91,000 '76 - 396,800
Tax Years: 73-76 none in tax years questioned
Petroleum Employee is sole shareholder '73 - 137,225
Henry Shotmeyer '74 - 176,900
1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,238 No dividends paid by employer '75 - 136,900
Tax Years: 73-75
Sale of agricultural and Employee is sole shareholder '75 - 181,074
industrial equipment '76 - 193,663
Elliotts, Inc. No dividends paid by employer
(1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,282
Tax Years: 75-76
Sale of nuts and bolts A owned 49,998 of 50,000 shares Emp. B
R. J. Kremer Co. B & C each owned 1 share '73 - 40,100'74 - 55,230
1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,069 No dividends paid by employer '75 - 52,650
Tax Years: 73-75
Manufacturing of industrial B had once owned 50%, he Emp. A
furniture finishes transferred 25% to A and 25% '72 - 70,000
Snyder Brothers Co. to third party '73 - 88,000
1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,275 Dividend amounts not clear '74 - 91,500
Tax Years: 72-74 from case Emp. B
'72 - 28,000
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COMMISSIONER ALLOWED
AS REASONABLE
COURT DETERMINES AS
REASONABLE COMPENSATION
ALLOWED COMPENSATION ADJUSTED
FOR COST OF LIVING TO JULY, 1981
MEASURED BY
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
Emp. X ranged from 145,000 in Court accepted figures of Emp. X
1971 to 212,295 in 1975 Taxpayer 1,280,000 to 1,876,000
Emp. Y ranged from 92,000 in Emp. Y
1971 to 116,148 in 1975 1,032,000 to 1,874,000
Emp. Z ranged from 62,071 in Emp. Z
1971 to 78,273 in 1975 161,000 to 459,000
Emp. A 34,223(s) Court accepts Taxpayers' 113,700
Emp. B 34,223(s) figures
Com. figures were not challenged
Emp. A Court accepted figures of the Emp. A
'73 - 97,885 Taxpayer '73 -301,000
'74 - 106,974 '74 - 278,000
Emp. B Emp. B
'73 - 95,857 '73 -268,000
'74 - 106,449 '74 - 250,000
Emp. A Emp. A Emp. A
'74 - 289,190 '74 - 807,930 '74 - 1,430,000
'75 - 318,109 '75 - 1,606,210 '75 - 2,650,000
'76 - 349,919 '76 - 1,044,930 '76 - 1,640,000
Emp. B Emp. B Emp. B
'74 - 289,190 '74 - 807,930 '74 - 1,430,000
'75 - 318,109 '75 - 1,606,210 '75 - 2,650,000
'76 - 349,419 '76 - 948,930 '76 - 1,490,000
73 - 50,000 '73 - 122,500 '73 - 252,000
'74 - 60,000 '74 - 165,000 '74 - 292,000
'75 - 59,999 '75 - 153,000 '75 - 252,000
'76 - 60,000 '76 - 147,500 '76 - 232,000
15,600 per year Court accepted figures of the '73 - 283,000
Taxpayer '74 -313,000
'75 - 226,000
'75 - 65,000 Court accepts figures of IRS '75 - 107,000
'76 - 65,000 '76 - 102,000
Emp. B Emp. B '73 - 58,000
'73 - 14,050 '73 - 28,000 '74 - 49,000
'74 - 15,830 '74 - 28,000 '75 - 43,000
'75 - 18,250 '75 - 26,000
Emp. A
'72 - 45,000
'73 - 50,000
'74 - 56,000
Emp. B
'72 - 17,000
Emp. A
'72 - 70,000
'73 - 88,000
'74 - 91,500
Emp. B
'72 - 17,000
Emp. A
'72 - 153,000
'73 - 181,000
'74 - 162,000
Emp. B
'72 - 37,000
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